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Abstract
The goal of this study is to establish a more applied, analytical approach to analyses of
collective identity and violence while providing insights into the dynamics of the regions
of Indonesia considered. By focusing on two regions of Indonesia - Aceh and
Kalimantan - which are populated by distinct peoples and have experienced violence in
contemporary times, this study contributes to the expanding literature on the social
dynamics of identity and violence. To ensure a more practical approach within the study,
concepts and frameworks which have contributed to discussions of the nature of identity
and acts of violence are utilized. The work of Brubaker and Cooper (2000) provides a
foundational understanding of identity which is complemented by Gurr and Bishop's
(1976) study of diverse forms of physical and structural violence. Through a fusion of
the authors' conceptualizations and terminology, a coherent understanding and approach
to the case studies is developed for the evaluation of identities and violence in Aceh and
the Western and Central provinces of Kalimantan. These case studies provide the
opportunity to evaluate the influence which identity has had upon violence in two regions
which have experienced eruptions of violence seemingly motivated by different values
and aspirations.
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As a maritime point of connection between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, the
archipelago of Indonesia has long been a critical juncture of regional and extra regional
commerce and exchange of social mores. The transfer of local and distant cultures and
values coincides with the interaction of peoples and regional transfers of populations.
Contact with various societies and cultures, as well as the isolation of some regions, has
contributed to the diversity of the peoples which populate the nearly 6,000 inhabited
islands of Indonesia. Today, Indonesia is populated by an array of communities which are
diverse in ethnicity, ancestry, religion, and traditions. This has come about as a result of a
regional history in which commercial, cultural, and colonial influences and exchanges
have contributed to the evolution of the social features of archipelagic societies. The
nature of Indonesia and the challenges it has faced in its contemporary existence are a
result of social influences which have contributed to the formation of shared and
individual identities which have impacted the dynamics of the archipelago. The violence
and social movements which have spanned the history of Indonesia have been driven by a
variety of factors and aspirations. Religion, ethnicity, ancestry, and other social features
as well as movements to protect these and further regional autonomy have variously
contributed to both regional cohesion and upheaval.
Individuals, nations, and states are all influenced and motivated by varying
conceptions of self and others. The confrontation of divergent self-understandings within
an individual creates an internal struggle to define oneself. In contrast, such clashes
between individuals within communities may escalate from civil interaction into discord
and violence. Similarly, intrastate or international confrontations often lead to violence
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and destruction through the use of physical force against a community or government.
This may be done in reaction to the threat which individual, group, or governmental
actions or dispositions are seen to pose. Strife may also ensue in retaliation for past
wrongs done or under a banner of tradition, cultural preservation, contestation of
resources, or other aims which motivate and incite acts of violence. The aligning of
customs, ethnicities, languages, religions and related social values with populations
contribute to the solidarity of such social movements. Conflicts within Indonesia and
around the world reflect the integral role which collective actions have consistently
played in discord between peoples. By contributing to a proclivity towards cohesion and
mobilization or discord and violence, expressed identities have advanced unification of
groups towards a shared goal, be that peace or conflict.
It has been said that ethnonationalism corresponds to some enduring propensities
of the human spirit that are heightened by the processes of modern state creation (Muller,
2008, p.35). Many values which are considered to contribute to identity - ancestry,
ethnicity, religion, and nationalism - are also viewed as impacting both the solidarity and
enmity which exist between peoples. Violence is considered by some to be founded upon
the social categories listed above as well as other social cleavages. As identities are
negotiated, the histories, traditions, and experiences of both stable and fractured
communities, regions, and states contribute to understandings of these dynamics and the
cohesion or violent action. The Indonesian provinces of Aceh and West and Central
Kalimantan have experienced strife and social movements which have featured violence
which has been carried out by collections of people with shared ethnicities, religions, and
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ancestral ties. These instances of collective violence have often been ascribed to the
existence of collective identities based upon these similarities. This study seeks to
consider the role which identities have played in instances of violence in the regions of
Aceh and West and Central Kalimantan, and to compare the two.
The Acehnese populations of northern Sumatra have sought autonomy and
separation from colonial powers, interim rulers, and the independent Republic of
Indonesia. Many communities in Aceh have viewed their traditions, religion, and culture
as inherently incongruent with a unitary, secular Indonesia. Their quest for autonomy has
been characterized by insurgency and violence as well as political engagement. Full
autonomy has not yet been realized. However, groups such as the Free Aceh Movement
(GAM) have won concessions and recently made progress in their goal for greater
representation through participation in regional elections. Unlike the Acehnese
population's confrontation with Indonesian authorities, Kalimantan has experienced
conflict between different communities which have divergent traditions, religions, and
ancestry. While contributed to by the transmigration policies of the Indonesian
government, this confrontation of peoples has centered upon the Dayak and Madurese
people of the Indonesian controlled portions of the island of Borneo. The differences in
the nature of these populations and histories, or played out in these conflicts, reflect the
complexity of social movements as well as the factors which impact the continuation and
conclusion of violent conflicts. Through a case-based comparison, this study will
elucidate similarities and differences between the conflicts which have arisen in Aceh and
Kalimantan. The ability to analyze these regions depends heavily upon an understanding
3

of national and regional contexts, including the history of the archipelago and the
Indonesian state. Through these understandings, a richer representation of the conflicts
can be developed and the relationship between identity and violence can be depicted.
Identities have been considered broadly in many fields of study, from
anthropology through political science. As such, it is necessary to base a consideration of
identity and violence upon well developed terminology and operationalized
understandings. The following sections will provide historical insights and clarify
"identity" to set the stage for the cases to be considered within this study.

4

Archipelagic and Indonesian History
“There are over three hundred different ethnic groups in Indonesia,
each with its own cultural identity, and more than two hundred and
fifty distinct languages are spoken…nearly all of the important
world religions are represented, in addition to a wide range of
indigenous ones.” (Giannakos, 2002, p.191)
The Republic of Indonesia is a Southeast Asian state which has been formed
through a convergence of diverse histories, cultures, and ultimately a violent struggle for
independence. Having experienced colonialism, independence movements, and various
challenges to national unity, Indonesia has emerged as a state seeking unification through
Pancasila principles, yet remains fragmented by its diversity. The nationalism which
arose in the years leading up to independence functioned as a unifying force for the
dominant populations of the region. However, this cohesion subsequently fragmented
into an array of social movements and conflicts, many of which have challenged the unity
of the Indonesian state. Violence and resistance movements have erupted in regions
throughout the archipelago, including Aceh, Kalimantan, Maluku, Papua, and Sulawesi.
These intrastate clashes have come as a result of conflict between peoples as well
as between communities and the Indonesian state. There have been deep impacts upon
regional institutions. Emergent identities and a nationalist rhetoric of independence have
drawn heavily upon the ancient kingdoms and historical underpinnings of archipelagic
Indonesia, as have contemporary social movements. Therefore, the histories of
antecedent societies have been integral in the evolution of the Indonesian Republic as
well as the identities and institutions which have formed throughout the archipelago.
As many authors have suggested, any attempt to synthesize the whole of
Indonesian history is a boundless task and would likely overwhelm the topics at hand.
5

Taking such conclusions to heart, this survey of Indonesian history selectively discusses
the character of ancient archipelagic kingdoms, the colonial era of the East Indies, as well
as the emergence of the independent Republic of Indonesia. This will facilitate clear
understandings of the early local, regional, and national features which have, in turn,
given rise to contemporary identities and added to both cohesion and discord throughout
the archipelago. Such identities have been formed through the melding of intra- and
extra-regional cultures and traditions as well as the historical experiences of peoples. An
early Indian presence, the ancient indigenous kingdoms of the archipelago, the presence
of various religious belief systems, and contemporary experiences with colonialism and
independence have all contributed to Indonesian archipelagic identities and social
movements.
Indian commerce and culture entered the region with sailors and traders as early
as the third century C.E. (Taylor, 2003, p.18). These travelers not only brought goods,
but also transplanted traditions, customs, and religions which were previously unknown
to the people of the archipelago. The limited ability of archipelagic peoples to afford rare
and expensive goods traded by the Indian merchants, along with the development of
merchant guilds in port cities, contributed to the dominance of port communities' over
inland societies and the transfer of an Indian styled class system throughout the region. A
variant of the Hindu caste system created social categories based upon economic
standing. Within this system, heads of ports and commercial centers adopted Indian titles
such as raja or maharaja to reflect their status and authority within society (Taylor, 2003,
p.20). Temples inspired by the religions of the Indian subcontinent were constructed in
reverence to Buddhist and Hindu gods and beliefs. These structures featured Sanskrit
6

writing which was not an indigenous language of the archipelago. Indian influence
continued to dominate the social conventions and organization of the early kingdoms.
While today these aspects of Indonesian history are often labeled as products of Indian
conquest and colonialism, the social influence of India and its contributions to the
creation of coastal and agricultural settlements which would form the basis of the early
kingdoms of the Indonesian archipelago cannot be overstated.
The ancient kingdoms of the archipelago and the cultural, religious and social
structures they drew from Indian culture represent a pre-colonial influence which had
strong implications for the future evolution of Indonesia and societies throughout the
archipelago. The maritime Sumatran kingdom of Sri Vijaya and the succeeding Javanese
empire of Majapahit are two such societies which would both have extensive interactions
with the Indian subcontinent and would contribute to the basis of identities and national
or regional movements (Tarling, 2001, p.16). Both have played an integral role in
archipelagic history.
The kingdom of Sri Vijaya developed between the seventh and thirteenth
centuries along the southeast coast of Sumatra. Tributaries, interconnected islands, and
local waterways allowed the kingdom to develop tenuous connections to the inland
communities of Sumatra. Its network of ports and commercial centers along sea lanes
allowed the kingdom to exercise control over portions of the island of Sumatra, the
Malaysian Peninsula, the island of Borneo, Sulawesi, and other coastal territories
(Tarling, 2001, p.16). The kingdom consisted of urban centers and cities along trade
routes throughout the central archipelago, yet lacked substantial inland territories,
agricultural resources, and the population necessary to cultivate a land-based empire. As a
7

result, control of sea lanes throughout the region along with naval conquests and
commercial networks were the way in which Sri Vijaya was maintained. The kingdom's
commerce extended throughout Southeast Asia as well as (in attenuated form) to the
Middle East and China, contributing to the transfer of people, cultures, and religions.
Interaction with extra-regional societies also developed the foundation for continued
exchanges by future kingdoms and states.
The geographically fragmented nature of the kingdom contributed to the
development of a political structure which consisted of “a political center which exerted
varying degrees of control over loose and amorphous geographical area...” (Brown,
2005a, p.3). Many of these connections were in the form of tributary or vassal relations
between the politico-commercial center and the peripheral lands. Local leaders ruled
these peripheral regions and were subordinate to the maharaja, who governed the Sri
Vijayan capital on the island of Sumatra. Leaders of this period gained legitimacy by
asserting ancestral connections to great empires within Southeast Asia and other regions
connected through maritime networks. In spite of its commercial supremacy throughout
the region, the thirteenth century saw Sri Vijaya diminish as commercial centers realized
their autonomy from the capital of the kingdom (Tarling, 2001, p.18). The ability of
vassals to operate independently along with the challenges posed to Sri Vijaya by newer
adversarial states and kingdoms of the region increased the instability of the Sumatran's
commercial network. Ultimately, due to the trans-regional dependence upon
mercantilism, this series of events led to the disintegration of the kingdom in the
thirteenth century. As the Sumatran kingdom of Sri Vijaya's dominance lessened, another
equally impressive empire solidified its control upon the island of Java.
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Increases in trade occurring throughout Southeast Asia had allowed for exchanges
and confrontations between Sri Vijaya and other kingdoms of the region. The end of the
sea-dependent kingdom of Sri Vijaya allowed for the expansion of territories centered in
the eastern regions of Java. By the end of the thirteenth century, as Sri Vijaya was
declining, the empire of Majapahit began to expand. Similar to previous kingdoms,
Majapahit maintained regular interactions with states throughout the region and outside
of Southeast Asia. As such, the temples, relics, traditions, and stories which have
transmitted this civilization’s history reflect a strong Indian influence (Taylor, 2003,
p.39). Tapping land-based resources such as the fertile soils and expanding populations
as well as the ability to capitalize on the commercial network established in previous
centuries, the kingdom developed resources not held by previous kingdoms.
The Majapahit kingdom would use these tools to consolidate east Java and to rule
territories throughout the western and central archipelago. Similar to Sri Vijaya, the state
was centered upon a capital city, also named Majapahit, which oversaw tributary cities
and settlements. The empire’s vassal states spanned from the lands of Aceh and the
Malaysian peninsula in the west to Ambon and less solidly to Irian Jaya (Papua) in the
east. This translated into control of much of the Java Sea and the Straits of Malacca.
However, west Java and the interior of the island of Borneo were not brought into the
empire due to resistance from the populations of Java and the inability to access the
interior regions of Borneo.
The vision of Majapahit rulers was the creation of an empire spanning the whole
of the archipelago, referred to as "nusantara" (Tarling, 2001, p.16). Whether the kingdom
fully realized its mission of a Javanese empire unifying the archipelago is disputed.
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However, the empire did span much of what has come to be known as Indonesia through
imperial and commercial networks which integrated large number of peoples and
territories. The empire expanded its land and maritime holdings throughout its existence.
Majapahit’s decline eventually came as a result of discontinuity in the succession of its
rulers and not of a failure of its network or control over vassal regions. Towards the close
of the fourteenth century the maharajas of Majapahit failed to maintain leadership which
shook the foundations of the empire (Tarling, 2001, p.16-17). In spite of its previous
strength, this lack of stability in the succession process along with the earlier introduction
and continuing spread of Islam would challenge the kingdom and lead to its eventual
collapse.
As Majapahit began to decline in the fourteenth century, Islam began to more
rapidly expand throughout the archipelago. In fact, it was ultimately a Muslim state
which would conquer the Majapahit Empire. During the decline of the Javanese empire,
"trader-rulers" of many vassal states converted to Islam to improve their commercial
prospects (Sar Desai, 2003, p.58). While Sri Vijaya and Majapahit were Indianized
kingdoms, and therefore influenced heavily by Hinduism and Buddhism, the rise of Islam
reflected a new influence in the region which led to the creation of sultanates and Islamic
settlements throughout the western and central archipelago. Islam entered the
consciousness of archipelagic peoples in the same manner in which Indian civilization
had influenced previous societies, through maritime commerce and subsequent inland
penetrations.
Acceptance of Islam in ports and communities in northern Sumatra, and the
religion's subsequent expansion to Java and other islands, would lead to the conversion of
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communities and eventually entire kingdoms throughout the region. Many traditional
stories allow the kings of ancient cities the honor of becoming the first of Muslim
converts in a region. The associated territories came to be known as sultanates. A ruler's
conversion to Islam dictated that his people would become Muslim as well and would be
governed according to the practices and teachings of Islam. By joining the pan-Islamic
community, which included civilizations in Spanish, African, Turkish, Chinese, Persian,
and Indian regions, rulers found themselves to be a part of a land-based yet seaborne
civilization which provided greater commercial connections and strength in confronting
the Hindu kingdoms and animist tribes of the archipelago. The resonance of Islam with
the peoples of commercial centers was facilitated by the presence of missionaries,
scholars, and artisans from the Muslim world. Cities on maritime trade routes, therefore,
formed epicenters for the expansion of Islam throughout the archipelago (Brown, 2005a,
p.4). Through commerce, there was a "...growing familiarity with Muslims over time,
and access to knowledge of Islam as a religion and civilization..." in many port cities
which contributed to the conversion of large numbers of archipelagic peoples (Taylor,
2003, p.75). The characteristics and events of the 14th through the 19th century C.E.
have been passed on through stories, legends, and traditions related to the conversion of
kings and the actions of Muslim holy men and local heroes who traveled throughout the
archipelago or made hajj (pilgrimage) to the heart of Muslim civilization. Just as Islamic
meta-legends and traditions have been passed from generation to generation, lesser
known beliefs have also been passed through portions of the archipelago.
Discussions of the religious and cultural influences of India (Hinduism and
Buddhism) and Muslim civilizations have often overshadowed the discussions of
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indigenous traditions and belief systems of Indonesian societies. The local and regional
religions of the archipelago are often referred to collectively as animism. This grouping
is not an indication of the connection or uniformity of faiths and belief systems, but is
merely a categorization to facilitate a discussion of diverse local religions and traditions.
Animist beliefs were developed previous to and have continued to evolve alongside
extra-regional religions which were transferred through trade and cultural exchanges.
The beliefs of animists are tied to individual communities or subcultures. Unlike
religions with a more universal orientation which claim validity and relevance for all
people in all places, animistic beliefs are generally focused upon localized natural
phenomena (sacred trees, rocks, etc.) and spirits which are believed to be bound to
specific lands (Taylor, 2003, p.104). Universal religions provided seafaring and mobile
populations of early settlements and kingdoms with belief systems which were not
dependent upon maintaining geographic proximity to sacred phenomena. The practice of
universal religions has supplemented geographically dependent beliefs. Animist beliefs,
unlike universal monotheistic and polytheistic religions, were not bound to a specific
time of foreign entry into the archipelago, but instead evolved indigenously and continue
to be practiced, both exclusively and in syncretic combination with other religions,
throughout much of the Indonesian archipelago (Taylor, 2003, p.104). Christianity has
played a lesser role in the faith development of Indonesia. European traders and
colonizers have introduced Christian beliefs to the region since the 16th century C.E., but
have had much more substantial impacts upon the nature of Indonesian society and
institutions.
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It has been said that the arrival of five small Dutch ships in the late sixteenth
century launched 350 years of Dutch rule of the archipelago (Taylor, 2003, p.144). The
Dutch arrived in Indonesia in 1595, nearly one hundred years after the arrival of the first
Europeans to the Southeast Asian region. Existing commercial networks established by
the Portuguese and Spanish which integrated port cities and regional trade centers were
built upon by the Dutch East Indies Trading Company (VOC) and other mercantile
organizations in the region. The VOC furthered its dominance in archipelagic trade
through military and commercial alignment with Indonesian rulers, raiding of
competitors, and the seizing of port cities from European and local competitors. Similar
to previous centuries, as commerce was fostered throughout the region so was the transfer
of populations, cultures, and traditions. Christianity, for example, was spread through
Dutch and other European peoples (especially missionaries) who converted various
populations. Through the development of an expanding colonial network of settlements
and semi-autonomous regions, the Dutch furthered their authority over trade, commercial
centers, and various localities throughout the East Indies. The dominance of the VOC
would transition into the socio-political unification and central governance of the Dutch
East Indies.
The Indonesian archipelago would continue to be dominated by the Dutch into the
1940s, until the Japanese captured and occupied these territories and other lands
throughout Southeast Asia. In the midst of World War II, from 1942 to 1945, the
Japanese took control of the Indonesian archipelago. This loosened the Dutch colonial
hold on the region and, as a result, the Japanese in one sense had freed Indonesian
populations from Dutch rule. The presence of the Japanese, however, quickly changed
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perceptions of them from that of a liberating force into that of an occupying power
(Taylor, 2003, p.321). Guerrilla violence and resistance movements erupted as the
Japanese continued their presence into 1945. As the Japanese saw their impending defeat
at the hands of Allied forces, the occupying authority developed the Investigating
Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence. The committee was
comprised of prominent leaders of the contemporary political generation, including
Sukarno and Hatta.
Sukarno's nationalist ideology of Pancasila, or "five pillars" was developed in
parallel with the work of the committee to be a guiding philosophy for the eventual
Indonesian state. Pancasila includes the values of nationalism, humanitarianism,
democracy, social justice, and a belief in one God. The investigative committee created
the foundations from which an independent Indonesian state would emerge. The values
and solidarity created through the committee and the philosophy of Pancasila would
remain integral in the evolving independence movement. The planning committee
created by the Japanese had allowed the Indonesian leaders to develop the framework for
an independence movement and on August 17, 1945, they declared Indonesia
independence. The Dutch, however, would attempt to regain control over certain
territories in the East Indies.
In 1945, the Dutch returned to the archipelago in a bid to resume their colonial
authority. While some segments of the archipelago sought independence from these
foreign colonizers, others fought for independence from the new Indonesian state. This
led some peoples to align with the Dutch in support of a resumption of colonial
governance in order to exclude themselves from the newly forming Indonesia. Indonesia
14

faced challenges from regions seeking to join a Dutch Federation of Indonesia as well as
rebellions in regions not accepting the formation and character of the Republic of
Indonesia (Brown, 2005a, p.15). The independence movement would simultaneously
fight off Dutch imperial authority and attempt to ensure political and territorial cohesion
throughout the archipelago. The battles of the independence movement would be fought
in all regions of Indonesia through guerrilla warfare and emergent Indonesian military
forces. After nearly five years of violence and struggle against the Dutch, the Indonesian
Republic gained independence in 1949. An Indonesian state had been realized. Within the
next year many of the smoldering rebellions and secessionist movements throughout the
country would be suppressed and folded into the republic. This political consolidation of
the archipelago, however, did not settle the underlying social issues to the conflicts. As a
result, many of the sources of resistance and violence remained just below the surface of
the "unified republic".
In their campaign against Indonesian independence, the Dutch appealed to
cleavages among regional populations to differentiate and fracture regions in an attempt
to regain control over them. This strategy included inflaming ethnic differences and
encouraging sub-regional political and social autonomy in order to fragment the unity of
territories held by the Indonesian state (Tarling, 2001, p.127). The continuance of
rebellions and secessionist movements reflects an era of partial disintegration of the
nationalism upon which the movement for independence was based. Populations in
many regions did not rally to the cause of the Indonesian Republic, but instead violently
resisted inclusion into the republic reflecting an aversion to rule by a Javanese-centric
government and the Pancasila national philosophy. The violence and social movements
15

for autonomy and the resulting instability were driven by the diversity of regional, ethnic,
and religious aims.
Conflicts based upon regionalism, differing religious beliefs, and socio-economic
issues continue to persist throughout Indonesia. While over sixty years have passed and
many political and social changes have occurred since Indonesia gained independence
from the Dutch, it is likely that the same general social challenges which led to violence
in the 1950s - conflicts of values and diverging aspirations - continue to exist. These
factors have contributed to the diverse social and political environments, as well as the
experiences and understandings of archipelagic peoples. Indonesia’s national governance
structures have also been formed by these forces and continue to contend with the
diversity of the peoples of the nation.
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Disentangling Definitions of Identity and Violence
The social and political features of communities and nations are influenced by
many forces. A variety of theories have been developed which provide
conceptualizations of these influences as well as definitions of identity and associated
violence. Many address the effects which identities have upon behavior, including
violence. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) are two such authors who begin by presenting the
conflicting definitions which exist for "identity". They also propose terminology which
will move the study of identity, including its influence upon social and political action,
towards greater analytical focus. The descriptions and analytical matrices of violence
developed by Gurr and Bishop (1976) are applicable in defining the forms and patterns of
individual and collective violence. These four authors provide the central foundation
upon which the analysis of identities and violence in the regions of Aceh and Kalimantan
will be built.
In their study titled "Beyond Identity," Brubaker and Cooper (2000) present
several uses of "identity" which are shared across a variety disciplines including
psychology, sociology, and international affairs. These fields have contributed to the
study of individual and group character and to current conceptualizations of identity. The
authors aim at bringing greater specificity and analytical utility to the term by
deconstructing it and developing more functional terminology for social analysis. Rather
than reifying identity as a general term of vague social and evaluative value they present
several "clusters" of terms which are meant to facilitate clearer, more effective
understandings. In doing so, Brubaker and Cooper seek to move "beyond identity" as a
term of analysis.
17

The competing definitions of identity which are included in their study are shown
to be inconstant and contradictory. Key uses of identity across various disciplines are:
•
•
•
•
•

a driving force behind social or political action;
a collective phenomenon of similarity among individuals;
an essential and core aspect of individual and social existence;
a process of interactive formation of self or group understanding;
a product of multiple competing facets of self invoked in varying contexts.

In each of these definitions of identity both internal (e.g., self-understanding, selfinterest) and external (e.g. categorical attributes, socio-economic status) features are
suggested or implied to influence the actions, values, solidarity and enmity individuals
and groups exhibit. However, each definition places value on a different aspect of the
term "identity".
The first use of identity presented by the authors is as the grounds upon which
social and political actions are founded. Actions are the physical representation of the
values and self-understandings which are represented within identities. These drive
action and are believed to be in competition with self-interest in determining both
individual and collective action. However, certain of the values and understandings
which contribute to identities are philosophically inconsistent. A dispute exists as to
whether race, ethnicity, gender, and other categorical attributes or more structuralist
categories based upon peoples' socio-economic positions are central contributors to
action. In spite of its internal conflicts, this definition considers individual and collective
identities to be strong motivations for social and political behaviors, including violence.
Identification of the sameness or solidarity of a group of people is another use of
identity. This feature can be present in terms of an objective characteristic and as a
subjective experiential or perceived identification. It can also be based upon both static
18

and shifting identifications. Social dynamics contribute to and reinforce the influence of
identifications based upon internal or external forces. The collectivity, which is alluded
to within this definition, assumes that individuals or groups who have aligning selfconceptions hold shared "dispositions and consciousness" (p.7). These shared qualities or
understandings are expected to contribute to the unity of people and the cohesion of their
actions. However, as a collective phenomenon, the inclusive solidarity and exclusivity of
peoples is developed through aligning identities.
The third approach considers identity to be a "deep, basic, abiding, and
foundational" sense of self (p.7). Identity is, therefore, comprised of stable and welldeveloped values and inclinations. As a self-understanding, identity can be an individual
or collective condition of social existence. It is, however, an essential attribute of people
which is cultivated over time. As the permanence and durability of this characterization
of identity suggests, great value is placed upon the development, preservation, and
recognition of identities by individuals and communities.
Additional uses of identity are somewhat intertwined as they reflect the formation
of identity through processes and interaction as well as the fluidity and multiplicity of
identities based upon context. The formation of individual and collective selfunderstandings is considered to be a product of social and political interactions.
Identities are negotiated. These exchanges lead to the development of collective
understanding and group cohesion. Influencing actors in these exchanges include
governments, social structures, and other individuals or groups. These work as the basis
for solidarity and action among individuals and groups. The environment and actions
above reflect the diversity of influential factors in identity's transition to action.
19

Just as the process of cultivating identities is diverse, so are the identities which
result. Individual and group identities are also "unstable, multiple, fluctuating, and
fragmented" in the final definition presented (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p.8). The
traits of individuals and groups are invoked and incited by external influences and
interactions. Reflecting the view that identities do not exist independent of internal or
external catalysts, the conceptions of self and active responses are dependent upon
context and situation. In short, certain aspects of an individual's identity will rise to the
surface when necessary or appropriate, but become increasingly dormant if the situation
or context requires it and if pressures lessen.
The authors recognize that the term "identity" is made to "do a great deal of work"
in discussions of motives for action, collective similarities, the permanence and
subjectivity of self-understandings, processes of self-understanding, and, finally, in
reflecting the inconsistent nature of the identities (p.8). These diverging and
contradictory understandings of the term conflate practical and analytical uses of identity
and cause it to become increasingly amorphous and indecipherable. These
operationalizations, in and of themselves, fail to provide a clear analytical framework for
the evaluation of the roles and influences of identity, let alone identity's role in violent
action. Inconsistent and ambiguous understandings of identities and the processes which
contribute to their formation diminish the value of identity studies. However, we can
draw from the conceptualizations above several processes and aspects which contribute
to their understanding. Brubaker and Cooper recognize this as a core conclusion of their
study and develop three "clusters" in order to move beyond the simplistic term "identity"
in analytical studies.
20

The unique approach developed by the authors deconstructs the interwoven and
contradictory meanings of identity into strategic terminology which contributes to greater
analytical focus in considering the aspects which contribute to behaviors. The removal of
several assumptions and reifications clarifies and gives momentum to a more complete
study of the social characteristics and features of individuals and groups. Several
groupings of terms which can reflect the diverse features of identity have been developed
to replace the overarching concept of identity. The three clusters proposed by the authors
are:
• Identification and Categorization
• Self-understanding and Social Location
• Commonality, Connectedness, and Groupness
Identification and Categorization
It is through identification and categorization that individuals and groups develop
internal and external understandings. These processes are common aspects of social life
which provide meaning and understanding to individuals and groups. The internal selfidentifications which individuals develop are often, but not always, influenced by
external inputs and categorizations. An individual may also externally identify himself or
be categorized by others. This is done through processes which are resultant from an
individual's identification of himself to others or others' recognition of traits or
characteristics and the subsequent categorization of that individual. These processes hold
strong influence over self-understanding, actions, and affiliation with others. There is,
however, an anomaly which exists within these processes which influences both
identification and categorization.
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“[F]ormalized, codified, objectified systems of categorizations developed by
powerful, authoritative institutions" have no local equivalent in authority, resources, and
pervasiveness (p.14). Modern states are said by Brubaker and Cooper (p.15) to be "one
of the most important agents of identification and categorization" which hold the
authority to define peoples and social structures. Access to the materials, symbolic
authority, and modes of imposing such categorizations allow governments to construct
the system in which individuals and groups exist. This, however, does not mean that the
state can impose identities upon individuals or groups. The state does not hold a
monopoly of influence. Other social formations, including families, schools, and
community groups, also influence the way in which social life is conducted. The
categorizations produced by states may be diffused easily, but they may also be contested
by individuals or groups. This can lead to the development of alternative categories not
envisioned by the state. Some of these become social movements, which are
characteristic of the ways in which external classifications can influence selfidentifications as well as the development of shared identifications to which people hold
an emotional or cognitive attachment.
Individuals or collections of people identify themselves and others based upon
relational or categorical features. Relational features suggest a social network or web in
which the individual or group is bound to others through interactions or exchanges.
These connections may include kinship, friendship, membership, or other forms of
affiliation. In contrast, categorical features lead to the labeling or grouping of peoples
based upon shared traits such as ethnicity, language, nationality, and citizenship which
differentiate them from others. Both of these groupings are utilized when individuals
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identify and categorize themselves and others. Of these two forms of labeling, several
authors suggest that categorical identifications have become increasingly important in
modern social environments.
This cluster represents the processual means through which identities are formed.
By pulling these meanings out of ambiguity, two clear ways in which people provide
themselves with meaning and localize others based upon the features (relational or
categorical) are developed. Furthermore, the recognition of the actors who identify and
categorize is something which the term "identity" fails to do. Also, these terms do not
hold the assumption that shared traits or labels are inherently indicative of internal
similarities, distinctiveness, or cohesion of individuals. Many previous understandings of
identity have assumed this to be true.
Self-understanding and Social Location
Unlike the terminology used to reflect the active processes undertaken by specific
agents - identification and categorization - this second cluster of terms considers features
which are more affective and cognitive in nature. The aim of these terms is the "situated
subjectivity" of individuals and groups. In short, focus is given to understanding where
people position themselves or others socially rather than focusing on the processes of
how they do so.
Self-understanding and social location represent an individual's sense of self, his
position within society, and the way in which he is willing or able to act. A disposition
towards certain actions is a reflection of these self-understandings and social locations.
However, the "self" considered through these representations is not a "homogeneous,
bounded, unitary entity" (p.17). Instead it exists in many forms and under the influences
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of a variety of social processes. Self-understanding and social location are often specific
to cultures, but may evolve over time and differ between people. They may, however,
also become increasingly stable and ingrained over time. Similarity across peoples and
times has often been inferred by the use of "identity", but self-understanding and social
location do not carry this assumption as they are more dynamic terms which allow for
diversity.
Such analyses of identity have encapsulated many concepts which are used to
represent individual meaning or understanding as well as social and political action.
Recognizing this, the authors suggest the use of self-understanding and social location as
replacements for recognition of individuals' internal meanings and more structuralist
representations of such understandings. This terminology provides meaning to relational
and categorical features and provides a focus upon the meanings developed in relation to
the "self" and "others". Self-understanding and social location contribute directly to
individual and groups' social and political actions.
Commonality, Connectedness, Groupness
The final cluster which the authors propose in order to move beyond the
limitations of the term identity is "commonality, connectedness, groupness" (p.19).
Commonality is one aspect of connection which represents a categorical trait which is
shared by people (e.g. ethnicity, language, nationality). The second term, connectedness,
draws upon the relational bonds which exist and the way in which they link people (e.g.,
family, civic organization, political party). Groupness is the sense of "belonging to a
distinctive, bounded, solidary group" (p.20). Categorical similarities are said to have the
potential to lead to the cohesion of a group, but relational bonds are singled out as a
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precursor for collective action. The combination of both commonality and connectedness
can lead to a sense of belonging, but enduring group solidarity is also dependent upon
shared narratives, experiences, and other aspects which consolidate group cohesion.
Through this terminology, the solidarity and exclusion which contribute to in-and
out-group dynamics are represented. "Identity" has been used to reflect both an abiding
oneness and less direct affiliations with others. The implications of using the term in
such diverging ways have been the inability to fully appreciate the varying degrees of
strength in these affiliations. Through these graded terms, a distinction is made among
the connections between people. This makes evaluations of their relative significance
and explanations for their existence more detailed. It also allows us to consider the
"cultural idioms, public narratives, and prevailing discourses" upon which these bonds
are developed while evaluating their "meaning and significance" (p.21).
Brubaker and Cooper close their work by evaluating their terminology against
three case studies with foci upon African lineage trends, East European nationalism, and
race issues in the United States. In doing so, the authors navigate the details of these
cases considering the unique features of each and relating them to their terminology as
well as other conceptualizations of identity. The authors conclude their studies by
asserting that added conceptual clarity is a requirement for "social analysis and political
understanding alike" (p.36). "Identity", as a term of analysis, is inconsistent, ambiguous,
and continually indicates reification. The adjectives used to qualify the term - ethnic,
religious, political, etc. - do little to improve its specificity. As such, their approach is a
way in which greater clarity can be given to the terminology and analysis of identity.
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Gurr and Bishop's (1976) "Violent Nations, and Others" provides
conceptualizations and frameworks for evaluating and delineating among various forms
of violence. The goal of the authors of this study is two-fold. First, the authors seek to
make conceptions of violence more substantive and clear. Second, they seek to map
global incidents of violence which occurred prior to the study's publication. While the
mapping and statistical analysis of global violence conducted by Gurr and Bishop hold
very little validity after over 30 years, the foundational understandings of violence still
hold meaning and are useful in the analysis of violent action.
"'Violence,' in virtually all of its usages, is 'harmful action' but that base
supports a great many different detailed definitions whose nuances seem
to depend on whose ox is being gored." (Gurr and Bishop, 1976, p.80)
As the quote above suggests, violence is a form of action which, much like
identity, encapsulates a variety of meanings. It can refer to individual or collective acts
which are carried out by a variety of agents towards diverging ends. Definitions of
violence often hold evaluatory, ideological, or empirical uses. The focus of the authors is
the development of empirical understandings which do not lead to either excessively
restrictive or broad understandings. Generalization is not the immediate goal. The
authors present their findings through a 4x3 matrix which represents varying levels of
analysis and forms of violence (Appendix: Figure 1). Two types of violence, physical
and structural, are identified in this matrix. Physical acts of violence, similar to structural
violence, are divided into two categories.
Physical violence is a category of actions which is characterized by bodily harm
or the threat of such action which evokes fear. This form of violent action is divided into
private and official acts, which are dissected further into different levels of analysis.
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Private physical acts of violence are often restricted by governments and can be
individual, collective, or transnational in nature. Private individual and collective
violence are represented by acts of bodily harm against oneself or others.
Acts of individual violence include suicide, homicide, and assassination. In
contrast, protest, rioting, rebellion, and coup are representative of collective acts of
violence. Transnational violence is not addressed empirically by the authors, but is
identified as acts of "transnational terrorism" (p.84). Gurr and Bishop present diverse
actions which are indicative of violence, but there lists are not exhaustive.
In contrast to private acts, official acts are the use of violence, often asserting a
level of legitimacy, in the service of the state or government. states utilize or threaten to
use physical force against their own citizens and foreign actors in a variety of
circumstances (p.88). These acts cannot easily be differentiated between their impacts
upon individuals or collections of people. Therefore, different actions which are brought
to bear against individuals or collections of people are represented, but are not separated
between individual and collective levels of analysis. Governmental sanctions, arrests,
executions, and deaths, and the intensity of domestic political conflict, are representative
of violence against individuals and collectives by governments. It is difficult to clearly
delineate between the individual and collective impacts of official acts of violence and
structures of coercion. As these actions and tools of the state may affect both individuals
and collectives simultaneously, the authors have fused these levels of analysis together to
reflect the inability to differentiate between these individual and collective impacts.
Other forms of government influence also exist outside of the application of physical
means.
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By developing a category for structural violence the authors allow for the
distinction between physical violence and structure-driven socioeconomic and political
victimization. "Structures of coercion" are the policies and institutions which
governments utilize when engaging with citizens and other nations (p.89-90). Indicators
of domestic structures of coercion include the size and resources of military and police
establishments as they are applied to maintain internal stability and control.
Transnational coercive influence is represented by military assistance, sanctions, and
other positive or negative engagements. The differentiation between structures of
coercion and patterns of denial recognizes the role of government engagement and social
and international disparities.
Patterns of denial are the product of the social and environmental influences
which develop and contribute to the continuance of differences in individual, collective,
and transnational access to valued social or economic goods. These influences are the
"farthest removed from what is conventionally called "violence" (p.91). They may or
may not be caused by government policies, a shared ideology, or shortcomings of elites
or institutions. Similar to the previous forms of violence, patterns of denial impact
individuals, collections of people, and other nations differently. Lack of food, shelter,
health services, education, and other social goods are recognized as individual
deprivations. Collective deprivations are indicated by denial of group autonomy and
systematic discrimination against "distinctive ethnic, regional, linguistic, religious, and
other communal groups" (p.92). Transnational deprivation is indicated by economic
dependence or exploitation of one nation by another, also referred to as economic
imperialism.
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Gurr and Bishop recognize two limitations in this matrix and the categorizations it
represents. The first is identified above as the challenge of isolating individual and
collective impacts from official acts of physical violence. The second limitation exists
within the cell where the transnational level of analysis and structures of coercion meet.
Information that could be used to populate this cell was not available to the authors at the
time of publication. However, as the focus of the subsequent case studies on Aceh and
Kalimantan are focusing upon intranational features, this will not limit the matrix's
applicability.
Another limitation of the study is recognized in its conclusion. The authors, while
valuing the conclusions they draw from their empirical study, state that the findings are
"obviously time-bound" and that "today's political eden may be tomorrow's killing
ground" (p.109). However, the multidimensional understandings of violence they
provide have the capacity to contribute a guiding framework for an analysis of violence.
Through the 4x3 matrix they develop it is possible to conceptualize a wide array of forms
of violence.
The works of these authors provide us with foundational understandings of
identity and violence which will contribute to effective analysis of the national and
regional contexts of Indonesia. "Beyond Identity", by Brubaker and Cooper (2000),
develops functional, cohesive terminology which facilitates an analytical approach to
individual and collective "identities" and their processes, values, and connections. While
their terminology provides greater analytical focus, the single term "identity" remains an
important encapsulation of these processes, values, and connections, which the relational
and categorical characteristics of people imbue. As such, the term will be utilized as a
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synthesis of the overarching representation of the "identification and categorization",
"self-understanding and social location", and "commonality, connectedness and
groupness" of people (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p.14-21). Similarly, the
understandings of violence and the matrix developed in "Violent Nations and Others"
provide clear delineations between various forms of physical and structural violence.
Gurr and Bishop's (1976) empirical analysis is out-of-date, but their approach is sound as
it continues to provide guidance in the recognition of a diverse forms of violence.
These articles provide a strong foundation for the analyzing and developing clear
understandings regarding the identities and violence of Aceh and Kalimantan.
Comprehensive evaluations of the relationship between identities and instances of
violence are complex and inherently challenging. However, it is through such
comparative studies that understandings of identity and violence can be furthered. As
such, the approach taken herein will utilize the frameworks developed by Brubaker and
Cooper (2000) and Gurr and Bishop (1976) while adjusting as needed. The historical
evolution of the Indonesian archipelago reflects an integrity yet diversity seen in the
cultures, customs, and unique social features which exist today.
Yet, to describe Indonesia as diverse fails to convey the unusual complexities
which exist throughout its islands. As the history of the region reflects, influences from
all parts of the globe have driven social and cultural evolution and contributed to the
formation of distinct populations. Maritime networks, expansive cultural exchanges, as
well as geographic obstacles, have both facilitated and limited exposure to ideological
transfers. In analyzing the identities and violence which have characterized Aceh and
Kalimantan, an understanding of the historical contexts of the archipelago are crucial.
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Case Studies
"...this whole culture in Indonesia is a culture of violence fighting between
families, fighting between villages, fighting between tribes, fighting
between ethnic groups, and finally fighting between religions" - Lt. Gen.
(Ret.) Prabowo Subianto (Collins, 2002, p.1)
As this quote suggests, instances of violence throughout Indonesia have emerged
along divisions created through social cleavages such as ancestry, ethnicity, and religion.
The identities exhibited by the people of Aceh and Kalimantan have been contributed to
and continually molded by historical and contemporary contexts which relate directly to
regional cultural values and experiences. These, however, are not sufficient to determine
the exact role of identity in the violence and conflicts which have erupted in
contemporary times. In order to provide a holistic representation of the connections
between identity and violence in Aceh and Kalimantan, the historical contexts of each
region will be presented in combination with the formulations of identity and violence
presented above.
Through foundational understandings of the history of Aceh and Kalimantan it is
possible to develop a more thorough analysis of the impact shared identities have had
upon collective action. The themes developed through the histories of the regions will
allow us to apply the three sub-categories of identity developed by Brubaker and Cooper
(2000). In this application of their concepts, the categorical and relational features of
Aceh and Kalimantan will be considered in combination with identification and
categorization processes, self-understandings and social location, and cognitive notions
of collectivity and group cohesion. This will facilitate the clarification and
deconstruction of group identities in the regions at hand. Building upon the terminology
and conceptualizations of Brubaker and Cooper, the findings and matrices of Gurr and
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Bishop (1976) will be utilized to consider contemporary connections between notions of
identity and collective violence.
The aim of analyzing the conflicts of these regions is not to point to the cyclical
nature of violence or to provide a rationale for future violent acts. Instead, focus will be
given to understanding the nature of violence itself and establishing the rational and
sources of collective violence actions. By first understanding the histories and identities
of regional societies it will be possible to gain a full appreciation for the distinct contexts
and experiences of these regions. This, in turn, contributes to the ability to effectively
analyze the role of these qualities in collective movements associated with violence.

Aceh, Indonesia
The heartland of the Acehnese people is located at the northern most tip of the
island of Sumatra. Aceh developed around the port city of Banda Aceh at a critical entry
point into the Straits of Malacca which grew to be a commercial center for sea-lanes from
the Malay Peninsula, India, and Arabia throughout the Southeast Asian archipelago. The
region is also a gateway to Mecca for Muslim pilgrimages. Resilient Muslim sultanates
have ruled Aceh and regions along the coasts of Sumatra. As a result, Aceh holds an
important place in the history of Southeast Asia and the existence of Islamic culture
throughout the Indonesian archipelago.
This history has also influenced the regional identities and collective actions of
the people of Aceh. Throughout its existence, Aceh has held a unusual position between
the Indian Ocean and the Indonesian archipelago. This geographic position has allowed
diverse influences to contribute to regional histories and identities. These influences, in
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combination with past and contemporary experiences, have provided the people of Aceh
with discernable qualities. Through an exploration of Acehnese history and the distinct
character and conflicts of the region a clearer understanding of the relationship between
the Acehnese identities and instances of regionally focused collective violence is
possible.
Regional Historic Overview of Aceh
The history of the region – conversion to Islam, the rise of a regional sultanate,
colonial interventions, and contemporary experiences with the rise of an Indonesian state
– reflects various experiences through which collective Acehnese identities have been
molded. Each of these contexts conveys relational and categorical characteristics which
also provide an opportunity for in depth analysis of the Acehnese people. This overview
will provide essential contexts which are necessary to fully appreciate the experiences,
grievances, and identities of regional populations.
Prior to the 13th century, independent settlements and communities existed along
the coasts of Aceh. These settlements were heavily influenced by their geographic
position along the maritime trade lines from the west into Southeast Asia. This provided
the region with Indian and Arabian influences, many of which continued to exist
following the formation of a regional Acehnese sultanate. Through its interactions with
peoples from distant lands, the settlements throughout Aceh developed distinct and robust
local identities (Reid, 2006, p.30). The Acehnese were some of the first people in the
Southeast Asian archipelago to convert to Islam. The conversion of northern Sumatra,
similar to other regions throughout the archipelago, occurred along central commercial
posts and cities along important maritime trade routes. Adoption of Islam in Aceh led to
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the rise of Muslim institutions and social values. The early conversion of people in Aceh
and other northern regions of Sumatra has acted as a source of pride and shared ancestry.
By the 16th century, many of the independent settlements of the past had become
Muslim communities or sultanates. The eventual dominance of one sultanate over others
within Aceh led to the creation of a unitary Acehnese sultanate in 1530 (Reid, 2006,
p.12). The strength of local social institutions and identities led to the existence of
precarious geo-political connections between the Acehnese sultanate, which was centered
in Banda Aceh, and its vassal states. While the sultanate was politically unstable, its
reactive nature allowed it to act as a unifying force in the face of conflicts with foreign
nations and external enemies (Reid, 2006, p.12). This fusion of the people of Aceh into a
single, unified entity formed the foundation for contemporary claims for an Acehnese
state and has provided one of several rationales for the region’s separateness from the
Indonesian state. At the same time the newly secured sultanate was rising, the Portuguese
had colonized Melaka and other territories of the Indonesian archipelago (Reid, 2006,
p.39).
The sultanate of Aceh reached a golden age during the 17th century and Aceh
consolidated both its military and economic dominance over the northern regions of
Sumatra. By applying these strengths the sultanate sought territorial expansion along
both sides of the Strait of Malacca. Expansion of the sultanate was challenged by the
Portuguese as the European colonial power began to acquire territories throughout the
archipelago, including Malacca along the eastern coast of the Strait of Malacca (Reid,
2006, p.39). Subsequent confrontations with the Portuguese and other regional
competitors led Aceh to seek material support from Arabian nations. The sultanate of
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Aceh continued to expand through territorial conquest. Sustained cultural interactions
with regions to its west and the ongoing conflict with archipelagic and extra-regional
peoples contributed to the further solidification of Muslim values, institutions, and
distinct Acehnese identities. However, the geo-political stability and cohesion of the
sultanate suffered due to continued “external military adventure” and the losses
experienced as a result of this imperial expansionism (Reid, 2006, p.47).
In the centuries prior to increased colonial interest in Aceh, the region had moved
from scattered and independent seaports into an Islamic sultanate of vassal states,
exerting military and economic force throughout the areas surrounding the Strait of
Malacca. These developments brought with them increasingly consistent features across
the region including common social and political institutions and increasingly related
notions of ancestry, religion, and ethnicity. As a region, Aceh emerged from the 17th
century as a central port along important sea lanes and held a strong strategic attraction
for European nations. The region had also come to view itself as “preeminent among
Malays” and was positioned strongly in the Islamic world as the gateway to Mecca from
Southeast Asia (Reid, 2006, p.49). European interest and intervention in Aceh would
become increasingly apparent in the 18th century. However, it would not be until the 19th
century that Aceh faced conflict with the expanding colonial ambitions of the Dutch.
Aceh, like much of Indonesia, confronted Dutch colonial subjugation. In 1873,
the Dutch invaded Aceh with the aim of conquering the region and incorporating it into
the Dutch colonial territories of the East Indies. Confrontation with the Dutch, differing
from past instances of conflict with Southeast Asian and Portuguese rivals, heavily
constricted the economic and cultural connections between Aceh and other regional
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Muslim communities, many of which had already fallen to Dutch forces. As a result of
its isolation, Aceh began to focus inward and develop institutions and organizations
parallel but separate from those emerging in other regional Islamic communities
(Aspinall, 2007, p.248).
Literature and narratives of the conflict such as the “epic of the holy war” (hikayat
perang sabil) presented the resistance to colonial control as an Islamic “jihad” and a battle
against foreign intervention (Aspinall, 2007, p.248). The Acehnese battled the Dutch
directly at first, but following advances by Dutch forces they began to engage in guerilla
warfare. After thirty years of continuous confrontation, both directly and through
guerilla tactics, Aceh was conquered in 1903 (Reid, 2006, p101). Continued resistance to
Dutch authority, primarily led by the ulama (religious leaders) of Aceh, continued
following the conquest of the region. The ulama derided the uleebalangs (local chiefs)
who cooperated with the Dutch. After retreating to their dayah (religious schools)
following the conquest of Aceh, the ulama preached against the presence of colonial
forces as well as association with foreign colonizers (Aspinall, 2007, p.248). They would
come to form the Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh (All-Aceh Association of Ulama), also
known as PUSA, in 1939.
PUSA, which gained thorough Acehnese support, was an expression of Aceh
focused religious reform. Previous organizations from outside of the region which
sought to modernize Islam in Aceh were met with strong resistance and, unlike the
Acehnese ulama-led PUSA, were viewed as seeking influences for elite and foreign
benefit (Aspinall, 2007, p.248). PUSA did not initially oppose the Dutch openly, but
instead focused upon the values of Acehnese history, specifically those from the golden
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age of the sultanate, to “…proclaim, uphold and defend the greatness of the holy Islamic
religion, especially in the land of Aceh…” (Aspinall, 2007, p.249). PUSA and many
Acehnese people came to embrace the concept of an Indonesia free of Dutch colonizers
and supported it as it was an extension of Acehnese and Islamic interests.
The Japanese invasion of Aceh, following the German conquest of The
Netherlands and its weakening colonial strength in Southeast Asia, ended the conflict
with the Dutch as they were removed from power. Japanese troops limited the ulama and
the uleebalangs’ political activities throughout their occupation (Reid, 2006, p.105).
When Japanese defeat in WWII became increasingly apparent, the Japanese attempted to
unify the clashing social and political views of the uleebalang and ulama in preparation
for Japanese surrender and Indonesian independence. In spite of these efforts, the
surrender of the Japanese left a power vacuum in Aceh’s political life.
Once Indonesian independence was declared in 1945, the Dutch returned to retake
their colonial territories. The leadership of PUSA publicly stated that Aceh had been “left
behind by its near neighbors” and distant Islamic nations (Aspinall, 2007, p.249). Instead
of this separation leading to estrangement, the ulama drew upon the rising archipelagicwide movement for independence from the Dutch as an alignment of Acehnese,
Indonesian, and Islamic interests. Ulama publicly declared that the people of Aceh were
“firmly united and obediently standing behind” Sukarno (Aspinall, 2007, p.249). The
Indonesian cause for independence would become the cause of the Acehnese people and
was increasingly framed by religious leaders as an extension of Aceh’s continuing
struggle to overthrow Dutch colonialism. Months after the Indonesian declaration of
independence was made, the ulama of Aceh stated the Dutch colonial authority would
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seek to:
“…enslave the Indonesian people and make them their servants once
more, and they will attempt to erase our holy Islamic religion and repress
and obstruct the glory and prosperity of the Indonesian nation” (Aspinall,
2007, p.249).
Aceh was one of the few regions which fully resisted The Netherlands’ attempt to
regain its colonies and acted as a bastion for the Indonesian Republic throughout the
struggle. The initial and subsequent resistances of Dutch control produced national
heroes from Aceh. The region and these symbols of the national independence
movement and have acted as a source of regional pride.
The idea of a unified Indonesia remained a concept which encapsulated Aceh and
other regions’ opposition to colonial dominance, and had become a point of shared
fortune as the independence movement gained momentum. However, the autonomy of
Aceh and the unification of interests would be temporary. As the Republic emerged
successfully from conflict with the Dutch the government of Indonesia, based in Jakarta,
began to consolidate power and impede upon the authority and religious autonomy of
Aceh’s population. This culminated with Jakarta’s dissolution of Aceh’s “autonomous
province” status and attempts at integrating the region into the new province of North
Sumatra (Lloyd and Smith, 2001, p.152-153). Further enflaming relations with the
region Jakarta denied Islam as the national philosophy, and adopted Sukarno’s Pancasila
in its place.
The Darul Islam movement of the 1950s formed in West Java, but soon Aceh had
joined the pursuit of an Islamic Indonesian state as a result of its grievances with the
policies and political formation of the secular Indonesian state (Lloyd and Smith, 2001,
p.151). The leader of Darul Islam stated, “Belief in One God is for us the very source of
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social life, and every single one of its directives must apply here on Indonesian soil”
(Aspinall, 2007, p.249). The aligning of this view with the regional aims of Aceh reflects
the centrality of Islam in the region. Furthermore, the Republic of Indonesia’s
encroachment into the region and the revoking of Aceh’s provincial status further
contributed to Acehnese support for the Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesia Islamic
State). This movement did not seek an Islamic state separate from the newly independent
Indonesian government, but instead aimed to “Islamise the state and uphold the dignity of
Muslim people in Indonesia” (Aspinall, 2007, p.249).
The movement gained support from other aggrieved regions as regional autonomy
was impeded and perception of Javanese dominance increased. It was publicly stated that
the region participated in the movement as an act of “solidarity with our brothers in
struggle in West Java, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and elsewhere” based upon a sense of
“Islamic brotherhood” (Aspinall, 2007, p.252). As the Acehnese revolt drew on and
confronted military losses, the focus became increasingly regional. Acehnese autonomy
became the goal rather than securing the importance of Islam throughout Indonesia. By
1962, the unitary Indonesian government conceded Special Territory status to Aceh,
which provided the region with increased authority over laws, education, and religion
(Bertrand, 2004, p.168). This allowed for the realization of an Islamic Aceh and the
implementation of Islamic law throughout the territories and institutions of the semiautonomous Acehnese regions. It further solidified notions of the distinctiveness of
Acehnese identity by formally recognizing the special status of Aceh and
institutionalizing this in regional social and political formations.
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In the years following the peaceful settlement of the Darul Islam revolt authority
began to be usurped by the Suharto regime, which negated the role of Sharia laws and the
fusion of state and religious schools within Aceh. Coercive military actions and policies
towards local political and cultural aspirations became increasingly prevalent. An Islam
influenced Acehnese nationalism and separatism began to gain momentum in the 1970s.
In 1976 the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was established, but gained minimal support
and experienced many setbacks before gaining widespread support in the 1990s (Aspinall
and Berger, 2001, p.1017).
The coercive military crackdowns by the Indonesian military of the 1990s led to
the deaths of thousands of Acehnese at the hands of the Indonesian government. Through
these acts of violent repression and the grievances they nurtured, GAM gained increased
popular support throughout Aceh (Aspinall and Berger, 2001, p.1017). The resignation of
Suharto in 1998 created a social and political environment in which GAM could engage
in greater political activity and also focus the Acehnese upon exposing the abuses which
had occurred over the previous decades. A perception of exploitation grew out of the
coercive governance, the central government’s collection of natural resource revenues,
and a perception of a policy of Javanisation” by the Indonesian state (Reid, 2006, p.326).
When new leadership had emerged in the central government a military presence
was reestablished. Aims of uncovering human rights abuses were soon replaced by goals
of statehood and independence. In this social and political climate, GAM gained
administrative authority with the support of students, rural populations, and some
members of the local ruling elites. Many of these local elites, however, continued to seek
greater autonomy from the central government rather than full independent statehood.
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GAM began to present a challenge to the central government and the Indonesian military.
Throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century, violence continually erupted as protests,
demonstrations, and riots took place throughout the region and were responded to with
armed force.
The tsunami which hit Aceh in December 2004 devastated the region. As a result
of the natural disaster, GAM and the Indonesian military reoriented their respective
positions to address the humanitarian needs and destruction wreaked upon Aceh and its
communities (Reid, 2006, p.310). This contributed to a stabilization of GAM–Jakarta
relations, which contributed to ongoing peace initiatives and increased autonomy and
political participation by Acehnese peoples.
This overview of Acehnese history, while limited in its specificity, provides a
representation of many underlying historical and social features of the region. It is
contextual in nature and contributes to the deconstruction of identities through more
contemporary regional contexts and experiences.
Deconstructing Acehnese Identity
Two forms of social features – relational and categorical –exist in the
identification and categorization, self-understanding and social location, and social
connectedness and cohesion of the people of Aceh. These are qualities that hold
influence over the formation of collective notions of identity and the cohesion of groups.
Relational attributes reflect the associations developed and maintained by individuals and
groups (i.e. ancestry, kinship, and membership). Categorical traits are those which act as
social labels of people based upon observable features. These traits often overlay and
interact with one another rather than existing separately. The concepts encapsulated
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within these two groupings are apparent in the labels retained by peoples and those
assigned to others. They are also observable through examinations of the understandings
and solidarity of peoples who share relational and categorical features. The labels
assigned and adopted by the Acehnese have made these relational and categorical traits
more concrete in their self-conceptualizations. The character ascribed to others has
similarly contributed to these understandings.
Identity is a term which binds cultural and religious mores passed from
generation-to-generation and the historical experiences of Aceh’s population. Acehnese
identities and the qualities which contribute to them are not static. Instead they have been
reshaped and molded by the socio-political evolution of the region and the cognitive
attributions of the Acehnese people. While there is likely to be diversity in the perception
and valuing of cultural features and historical accounts, it is evident that Acehnese people
maintain common self-identifications and -understandings through these features. The
social character achieved through these shared notions of identity and their continuing
negotiation has contributed to distinct Acehnese notions of identity which, while not
necessarily shared by all Acehnese people, are socially pervasive.
Acehnese, as a label of ethnicity, is the result of collective internal identifications
and external categorizations by others. In and of itself, this piece of Acehnese identity
combines the experiences and the relational and categorical qualities of the people into a
singular label. The territorial, religious, and lingual ties which have been shared among
Acehnese peoples have, similarly, contributed to affinity among the Acehnese. Acehnese
identities have also been contributed to by shared histories and common grievances
which are related to the aforementioned social traits. Contemporary grievances have
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heavily influenced identification and notions of identity held by many Acehnese. These
have, in turn, contributed to the nature of the solidarity and cohesion experienced in
Acehnese society. These grievances relate to the impeding of regional autonomy, the role
of Islam in society, exploitation of the region’s people and natural resources, and the
violence visited upon the Acehnese by the colonizing forces of European powers and the
Indonesian state. Ancestral territory has acted as a relational feature of Acehnese identity.
Historical and enduring connections to the ancestry and homelands of the
Acehnese people have acted as a source of regional pride and identity. While not
addressed by Brubaker and Cooper (2000) in their description of the two groupings of
social qualities, the territory of the Acehnese people has been an essential aspect of
historical narratives related to the rise of an Acehnese sultanate and a common reference
in Acehnese contemporary conflicts. Territorial integrity has acted as a source of
organization in defense of Aceh’s regional autonomy and the distinctiveness of the people
who populate these lands.
Connection to these territories has been developed over time through processes of
Acehnese identification with each other throughout these lands and categorization of
other peoples as outsiders and as foreigners. The social movements which have risen in
defense of these territories, including the Acehnese sultanate’s battle with the Dutch,
contemporary guerilla resistance, and the political organizations of PUSA and GAM,
have reflected collective self-understandings of the Acehnese people. Confrontations
with invaders have been undertaken to secure the social, political, and religious autonomy
of the region. These movements have been motivated by the self-understandings and
social location of Acehnese people. By ensuring Acehnese control of the region, peoples
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who have engaged in these instances of resistance have sought to ensure regional culture
and language, Islam, and the benefits of natural resources of the region were preserved
for themselves and other Acehnese.
Furthermore, Acehnese history has centered within the region of Aceh and
nowhere else in Indonesia is there a greater concentration of this ethnic group. Although
the people of Aceh sought extra regional conquests in lands in close proximity to
Acehnese ancestral lands, the northernmost point of the island of Sumatra is the epicenter
of the peoples’ cultural, religious, lingual, and ancestral roots. Without these territories
Acehnese social standing within the Indonesian state would also degrade, thus
diminishing the ability of the Acehnese to ensure the preservation of their traditions,
beliefs, and history. By maintaining autonomy and authority in the region, the Acehnese
people have cultivated a sense of pride and status and grown a regionally distinctive
society and essentially Acehnese social institutions.
Clashes with the Dutch and the Indonesian government have been driven by
desires to maintain regional authority over the Acehnese homeland in combination with
collective desires to remain autonomous and ensure a significant position of Islam within
Acehnese, if not Indonesian, society. The Acehnese, through name, narratives, and
contemporary experiences, hold a strong bond to ancestral lands which were part of the
first Acehnese sultanate and have been held by the people throughout ongoing decades of
strife and resistance to foreign colonialism and encroachment. In short, territory is
heavily bound to the identification, cognitive affinities, and associations of the Acehnese
people.
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Islam is also “an important feature of Acehnese cultural and political life” and
exists as both a relational and categorical trait of regional identities (Brown, 2005a, p.2).
Islam has been fervently defended by the people of Aceh and has contributed to their
identifications and subjective understandings. The longstanding historical and social
pervasiveness of Islam, including its collective influence through institutions (i.e. social
hierarchy, courts, religious organizations) and representatives (Ulama), have cemented
the religion as a key aspect of Acehnese social life. Furthermore, past conflicts with
archipelagic and colonial forces also contributed to the region’s religious affiliations and
Islamic roots as the gateway to Mecca.
The regional importance and value of Islam have been cultivated since the
religion’s introduction before the 13th century. Subsequent social developments and
experiences such as regional sultanates, colonialism, and independence era politics
created strong connections to the religion. Islam has been at the center of contests with
the post-independence and contemporary Indonesian government into the 21st century.
Religious leaders have been a rallying point for notions of Acehnese religious identity
and nationalistic aims. This has further contributed to the linking of Islamic beliefs and
values with regional conceptions of self and collective social movements.
One of the grievances held by the people of Aceh has been the spurning of Islam
and adoption of the five pillars of Pancasila as the foundational principles of the
Indonesian state. Challenges to regional religious autonomy have oriented much of the
Acehnese against any form of external imposition upon Acehnese Islamic traditions and
values. Through the conversion of the region to Islam and the social influences, conflicts,
and grievances that followed, Islam has become a strong feature of Acehnese identity.
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Language has similarly contributed to the identity of Acehnese peoples, as a categorical
trait.
Acehnese language has played a role in the processes and labels related to
identity. Throughout the many centuries which are discussed in the historical overview
above, Acehnese remained the language of social life in much of the northern regions of
Sumatra. The people of Aceh did not look to surrounding areas, such as Java, for
symbols and cultural influence, but instead were directly affected by the influx of Arabic
during the process of regional conversion to Islam. While Acehnese remained a
predominant language of the region, Arabic script was adopted in written communication.
Official documents, historical texts, and religious literature in Aceh were all written in
Arabic (Taylor, 2003, p.212). Cultural interactions between Aceh and Java were minimal
and Aceh’s languages and society, specifically its religion and history, drew instead from
cultures outside of the archipelago, specifically Arabia and its religious scholars.
Acehnese language and writing have differentiated the Acehnese from other Indonesian
and Southeast Asian communities. The region is home of Acehnese language which
continues to utilize Arabic script in certain written communications. This differentiation
in social communication reflects another aspect of Acehnese culture which creates clear
identifications and categorizations to distinguish the Acehnese from others peoples in the
region.
Foundations of Acehnese identity – ancestral lands, religion, and language – have
also played a role in the social and political relationships which exist among Acehnese
people. Regionally focused organizations and the associations of peoples with shared
historical, cultural, and religious notions have been formed and championed regionally
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distinct values. Specifically, the commonalities and connectedness of these people have
been reflected and impacted by the contributing features of identity addressed above.
Through these qualities the people of Aceh share common attributes and can, therefore,
be said to exhibit commonality and connectedness. These two features, however, only
reflect that there is the likelihood and probability of belonging to a collective.
The final piece to this puzzle is the “groupness” of the Acehnese. Do people feel
a cognitive sense of belonging to a unique and cohesive group? This feeling of
attachment is a subjective, internal aspect of external associations which is developed and
acted upon by individuals or groups. Just as an individual can be drawn to another
person through shared values, so can individuals and groups of people unite under shared
interests and aims. A glimpse into this sense of belonging can be seen through the
participation of individuals in organizations, institutions, or activities which are
undertaken based upon a set of principles or values.
Regional participation in social movements and groups such as PUSA, Darul
Islam and GAM have allowed for the acting out of “Acehnese” perspectives as well as a
reflection of their participants’ individual and collective identifications, selfunderstandings, and notions of group attachment. GAM and its contemporary resistance
of the Indonesian state is an example of one such organization. Its values have focused
upon Acehnese nationalism, regional autonomy, and the grievances held by Acehnese
people. Each of these is an aspect which connects the people of Aceh, but may not
necessary appeal to their acceptance or joining of the Free Aceh Movement. Therefore, it
follows that those people who have joined the movement hold an attachment or interest to
the values and aims of GAM. This investment may stem from varying sources such as
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financial gain, expression of violence, and others, but it still remains that individuals have
bound themselves to the collective movement and hold a sense of belonging to it.
The shared categorical and relational traits of those participating in GAM and
other movements play an integral role in their ascription to the values and actions of
collectives. Through these label and network driven similarities people are likened to one
another which increases the potential for shared identifications, self-understandings, and
association. The varied support for the social movements referred to above suggests the
inconsistency of identification with others and the need for shared appreciation of
experiences, narratives, and values in order for group cohesion in association and action
to be achieved.
This section has provided insights into the relational and categorical traits which
have formed the basis for Acehnese identity formation, conceptions of self, and
relationships. It has also provided insights towards an understanding of the role of
identity in instances of collective violence. The values of Acehnese identity presented
above do not account for every instance of identity formation and self-understandings
which occur in Acehnese society, but instead have focused upon the most prevalent
categorical and relational features of Acehnese peoples. The following section will assess
the connection which exists between these features, as well as the overarching concept of
identity, and occurrences of collective violence in Aceh.
Regional Collective Violence
Gurr and Bishop’s matrix of “Comparative Indicators of Types of ‘Violence’”
provides us with a lens through which we can appreciate not only the actions that are
indicative of violence, but also recognition of the form of violence and the entity which
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carried out these acts. Through their work it was made increasingly possible to
understand the nature of violence. While this approach does not account for the contexts
of history and underlying notions of identity or grievance, the previous sections
addressing the history and identity of the Acehnese people has provided a presentation of
these core understandings which will inform our recognition of the role of identity in
violence.
Conflict and violence in Aceh have occurred in many forms. They have varied
dependent upon the actor that has carried them out and the nature of these actions. By
considering contemporary violence in Aceh and utilizing the work of these authors, this
section will address the relationship between identity and collective violence.
To provide a scope which focuses on contemporary instances of collective
violence, periods of conflict and instability between 1989 and 2004 will be considered.
This timeframe will be broken into two sections. The first covers the social upheaval and
violent acts which occurred between 1989 and the fall of Suharto in 1998. The second
will continue where the previous timeframe left off and consider the “harmful actions”
which occurred from 1999 to 2004 (Gurr and Bishop, 1976, p.80). As the comparative
indicators developed by Gurr and Bishop present, there are a variety of forms, agencies,
and actions which can be termed as “violence.” These various qualities will be
considered in relation to the understandings of Acehnese history and identity developed
in the sections above.
Beginning in the mid-1980s the Free Aceh Movement began to gain social and
political significance. GAM has regarded itself and existed as a guerilla movement from
its emergence in the mid-1970s. The expanding tacit and overt support experienced by
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GAM in this period was obtained through references to the shared notions of identity and
regional grievances (Thalang, 2009, p.332). While GAM eventually diverged from the
values of the 1950’s Darul Islam movement, it was founded on a similar appeal to Islamic
ideals and ethnonationalism which focused upon essentially Acehnese themes.
Grievances related to regional commercial exploitation, continuing military occupation
by Indonesia, as well as historical sources of frustration contributed to the movement’s
appeal. Regional narratives of past conflicts were recited and applied to the
contemporary conflict. In short, the movement drew upon the ancestral, religious, and
ethnic aspects of Acehnese identity as well as local and regional grievances to gain
material support and manpower.
Between 1989 and 1998, GAM engaged in violence, rebellion, and attempts to
destabilize the New Order government’s authority in Aceh. During the mid-1980s small
numbers of GAM forces received training in lands outside of the archipelago in
preparation of a military confrontation with the central government, which led to the
introduction of renewed governmental military interventions (Reid, 2006, p.139). The
movement was armed and initiated a guerilla style insurgency against the Indonesian
state. In this climate of violence, civilians including “civil servants, judges, members of
the regional parliaments, and village heads were intimidated, kidnapped or shot” (Reid,
2006, p.230). The Acehnese people supported the movement silently by allowing GAM
guerillas sanctuary in their homes and villages. The guerillas would attack from within
communities and then disappear back into surrounding areas. While political outlets for
GAM such as the United Nations and calls for referenda began to be explored during this
era, insurgency and violence were the central tools utilized by GAM and its supporters.
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In response to the increasing threat posed by GAM throughout Aceh beginning in
the 1980s, Suharto’s New Order government established a permanent military presence in
the region which responded fiercely to the GAM threat (Thalang, 2009, p.332). This was
done to protect industrial and commercial infrastructures and the Indonesian
governmental interests in Aceh. In the 1990s, thousands of additional troops were added
by the New Order government to the existing thousands of security forces already
stationed in Aceh. This was one piece of the Indonesian Republic’s Daerah Operasi
Militer (Military Operations Region or DOM) period in Aceh, which would last from
1989 through 1998. Numerous abuses of the civilian populations occurred as a result of
the government’s response to the covert and guerilla tactics of the organization which
integrated GAM members into communities throughout Aceh.
It has been estimated that between mid-1989 and mid-1991 one to three thousand
civilians were killed in Aceh by Indonesian military forces (Bertrand, 2004, p.172; Reid,
2006, p.163). The torture, killing, arrest, and execution of suspected Aceh supporters
were carried out by military forces throughout the DOM era. By the mid-1990s much of
GAM’s operations had been dismantled by the Indonesian military. However, the
military continued its application of force and sought to weed out the remaining
supporters of the GAM. Hundreds of people disappeared and more than 2,300 were
tortured while a “climate of fear and intimidation” was stoked throughout Aceh by the
Indonesian DOM (Bertrand, 2004, p.173).
The physical violence which was characteristic of military operations was
accompanied by coercive methods. The bodies of GAM suspects killed by the military
were positioned along roads to intimidate Acehnese communities to disassociate with
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GAM and its supporters (Bertrand, 2004, p.172). The arrest, torture, and killing of
Acehnese and other peoples were also carried out by Indonesian forces. The Acehnese
and other communities in Aceh were forced to live under fear of death by the Indonesian
military which abused, discriminated, and heavily limited their autonomy.
The fall of Suharto and the collapse of the security authority in Aceh in 1998,
allowed GAM to revive its public presence and rhetoric. Similarly, a student-led
movement for a self-determination and statehood referendum had gained momentum. It
was expected by much of the Acehnese population that the new government, led by
Habibie, would address and deliver justice for the abuses of the New Order Government’s
DOM policies. The new government failed to sufficiently address the grievances of the
Acehnese. However, the withdrawal of “non-organic” military troops had been declared.
Celebrations surrounding the removal of troops from Lhokseumawe, the second
largest city in Aceh, turned into a riot in the city and surrounding communities (Bertrand,
2004, p.175). The government response to the riot was the movement of more troops to
the region to secure commercial interests and stabilize the situation. However, this and
similar incidents, combined with the apparent resurgence of GAM, caused the military to
establish increased visibility throughout Aceh and maintain a continuing presence. An
escalation in violence occurred between GAM and the Indonesian police and military
beginning in 1999. This expanding conflict undermined the student-led referendum
movement and resulted in the rise of identity and grievance based appeals to resist the
Indonesian state.
The frequent killings, raids, and disappearances of Acehnese by Indonesian forces
in districts throughout Aceh allowed GAM to increase its public presence and
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emboldened its statements. Physical clashes between GAM and the local police and
military units also became more widespread. In response, the security forces expanded
their raids and sweeping operations in districts throughout Aceh. These operations
included attacks on suspected GAM supporters and villages harboring GAM members.
Between December 1999 and January 2000 it was estimated that at least 105 people died,
while in 2000 alone approximately 960 people were killed in battles between GAM and
police and military forces (Bertrand, 2004, p.179-180). The Indonesian government’s
presence in Aceh was viewed as necessary to respond to GAM and Acehnese insurgency.
Police and military raids continued to be a regular occurrence, as “they constituted
normal police operations” and the military presence was asserted as the Indonesian
government’s “sovereign right” (Bertrand, 2004, p.179). Although the DOM era was not
reinstated, Indonesian military practices maintained a similar presence throughout Aceh
which continued into the early 2000s.
“the troops always propagandize that they come to Aceh to protect the
people, but the reality is that they kill the people…The GAM armed forces
will continue to pursue these troops who harm and kill…” (Reid, 2006,
p.168).
GAM and its supporters also engaged in violent acts in support of an ongoing
insurgency. From the demonstrations and riots of 1998 and 1999 into more recent
assassination attempts against political leaders, soldiers, and civilians GAM responded in
kind to the police and military operations of Indonesia. The tactics of the movement and
its supporters have been to attack Indonesian political structures, energy and commercial
interests, and institutions and people that represented an Indonesian presence in Aceh.
One such attack was carried out against an Exxon Mobil plant which suspended
operations in March of 2001. The approach of the Acehnese and GAM did not change
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much from its activities from 1989 to 1998, but instead this earlier period had worked as
a proving ground for their tactics and their support networks. The grievances of the
Suharto era were aggravated when the new government failed to address the ill-treatment
and abuses of the past. Furthermore, public outpouring of support of a self-determination
referendum had also incited increased support not only for the student led movement
which deteriorated in 1999, but it left a space in which GAM was able to take up the
cause of independence through violent means. The conflict between GAM and the
Indonesian government has quieted, but the legacy of these acts of violence and the role
identity and grievances have played in them remain under the surface of the relative calm
experienced today.
The timeframes discussed above can be characterized by their acts of physical and
structural violence, as developed by Gurr and Bishop (1976). GAM and its supports were
primarily a source of physical violence. Homicide and assassination are two behaviors
carried out by GAM and its supporters which are categorized as private, nongovernmental acts of individual violence. These were acted out at an individual level by
non-governmental actors within Aceh. Acehnese communities also engaged in collective
acts of violence including demonstrations and riots. GAM and the Acehnese’ continuing
insurgency also qualifies as a collective rebellion. It is apparent that violence played an
important role in the dynamics of Aceh and its people during these eras.
Indonesian forces also engaged in similar forms of violence. The variance
between these acts was that of the agency. The Indonesian police and military forces, in
contrast, are an official agency of the government. Arrests, disappearances, and
executions were carried out at both individual and collective levels by these official
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entities. Furthermore, their actions could also be termed “deaths from internal conflict”
which Gurr and Bishop categorize as an act of violence at a collective level of analysis.
Their actions blur the lines between individual and collective levels of analysis as their
violence was visited upon individuals as well as local communities and the entire
population of Aceh. Beyond physical violence the Indonesian government also
maintained structures which were violent in nature. The presence of police and military
forces, specifically their size and resources, made them a structure of coercion against the
people of Aceh and specifically the Acehnese people and GAM. Similarly, these
institutions and other social and political structures put in place by Indonesia denied these
people autonomy and discriminated against Acehnese culture and communities. These
structures are a compounding factor which extended the prevalence of Indonesian
violence beyond physical means into institutions which applied violence to regional
populations.
Sub-Conclusion
In Aceh, the ancestry, territory, religion, and language of the Acehnese have
contributed to the development of an exclusive ethnic category. Through these
foundations of Acehnese identity both commonality and collectiveness have been
advanced, embodied by GAM. Furthermore, the grievances developed throughout the
region’s history have combined with these similarities to shape a sense of belonging and
distinctiveness within the Acehnese community which is referred to by Gurr and Bishop
as “groupness”. Regional conflicts have ranged from competition of archipelagic
sultanates to the Indonesian state’s contemporary exercise of sovereign authority over the
province of Aceh. In the recent instances of collective violence considered above, the
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guerilla resistance of GAM has been characteristic of private acts of physical violence at
both individual and collective levels.
GAM and its supporters have confronted the perceived and real threats
posed by the Indonesian Republic to Acehnese autonomy, culture, and socioeconomic status. This conflict has been engaged in by GAM through guerilla
warfare and regional raids, attacks, and structural oppression by the Indonesian
Government. GAM has utilized shared notions of Acehnese identity to appeal to a
broad regional base of support. By appealing to the self-identifications and
understandings of Acehnese people and kindling the categorizations and grievances
tied to outsiders and the Indonesian state, GAM was able to establish increasing
collective cohesion within local communities and made progress in gaining greater
influence within and protection from Acehnese society. Such appeals also allowed
GAM to draw support from the regional population for its insurgency and acts of
violence in pursuit to distinct Acehnese values and aims. Acehnese peoples’ acts of
collective violence in Aceh were supported by aspects of Acehnese identity and the
grievances which had been cultivated throughout the region’s history.

West and Central Kalimantan, Indonesia
Borneo is an expansive island which is located in the midst of the Malaysian
Peninsula, the archipelagos of Indonesia, and the Philippines. Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Brunei share the lands of the mountain and rainforest covered island. The Indonesian
region of the island, collectively called Kalimantan, is divided into four provinces:
Kalimantan Barat (West), Kalimantan Timur (East), Kalimantan Selatan (South), and
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Kalimantan Tengah (Central). They provinces combine to make up more than half of the
landmass of the island of Borneo. Each of these provinces is home to peoples with
diverse ethnic, ancestral, lingual, and religious histories. The provinces of West and
Central Kalimantan are the focus of this case study as both regions have had
contemporary experiences with collective violence. These conflicts have been predicated
upon cleavages which are representative of the identities of distinctive peoples. The
region has also been the setting of past attempts at the creation of a homeland for the
indigenous populations of Kalimantan as well as transmigration policies which have
introduced peoples from the far reaches of Indonesian territories.
All of the provinces of Kalimantan are home to distinctive indigenous
communities and peoples from regions throughout the Indonesian archipelago. The
character of local history and traditions has been formed through many experiences
including commercial exchanges, colonialism, foreign occupation, and Indonesian
independence. The detachment of some regions of Kalimantan from these regional
dynamics has been due to the internal geography of the island. This has allowed for the
secluded evolution of many indigenous cultures throughout much of the region’s history.
In contrast, other regions, such as coastal settlements and areas rich in resources, have
been increasingly incorporated into the experiences and trends of the archipelago and
greater Southeast Asia. As provincial boundaries have been redrawn throughout the
region’s past, the historic overview of Kalimantan will be concerned with all of the
provinces of Indonesian controlled Borneo. This history will be followed by an
examination of Dayak identities, which will be related to contemporary instances of
violence in the Indonesian provinces West and Central Kalimantan.
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Regional Historic Overview of Kalimantan
Many studies of Kalimantan’s local and regional histories have focused heavily
upon the contemporary experiences of the region. As a result, an attempt at a complete
historical overview of the region is likely to fall short of a full representation of the
complexities and diversity which have existed and continue to persist in Borneo’s social
and political formations. As many histories of this region are relatively limited, this
section will focus upon the years prior to the fourteenth century. In spite of this
limitation, this section seeks to develop a succinct yet substantial presentation of the
history of Kalimantan.
Between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, as was true throughout the
Malaysian peninsula and the Indonesian archipelago, the Majapahit Empire maintained
vassal states on the Island of Borneo (Taylor, 2003, p.92). The proximity of these
territories to the Java Sea provided the Javanese centered empire with tributary
settlements spanning from the southern lands of Borneo as far north as the South China
Sea. Majapahit provided the military and commercial support necessary for these ports to
sustain themselves and to expand commercial exchanges within the region. As the
Majapahit Empire had fallen into decline by the 16th century, coastal ports of Kalimantan
had risen as Muslim sultanates and continued to play a central role in regional and extra
regional trade (Taylor, 2003, p.75).
The Portuguese and Spanish established trading relations with these societies in
the early part of the sixteenth century. This and previous eras of increasing commercial
expansion and rising Islamic cultures along the coasts of Borneo encouraged Dayak
migration further into the interior of the island. Over the course of several centuries, the
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Dayak people would come to settle the central regions of Kalimantan and establish social
and economic relationships with the other peoples along the fringes of these regions
(Taylor, 2003, p.197). As a result, Dayak culture, customs, and animist religions would
become intertwined with the lands of the interior of the island.
At the beginning of the seventeenth century the Portuguese and Spanish trade
monopoly throughout much of the archipelago, including Borneo, was broken by the
Dutch. The VOC succeeded in replacing Mataram influence with their own by
intervening and participating in the affairs of Muslim kingdoms (Taylor, 2003, p.145146) The northern coastal regions along the South China and Sulu seas were often raided
by pirates emanating from Sulu and other surrounding islands. British interests,
particularly in the north and west, diminished the presence of the Dutch in these regions
and focused the VOC upon the lands which today are part of Kalimantan.
The indigenous peoples of Kalimantan existed outside of the administrative
authority of the Dutch throughout much of the colonial era of Indonesia. The controls
and boundaries established during the Dutch colonial era primarily existed along the
coasts of the island, while tribal groups primarily inhabited the interior regions of
Kalimantan (Bertrand, 2004, p.50). This territorial dichotomy ensured the preservation of
indigenous people’s cultures, social traditions, and institutions. The coastal regions of
Kalimantan were made up of Dutch administrative units which acted as commercial and
maritime nodes for the VOC. This left much of the interior of the island unexplored by
Europeans. The people who inhabited the coastal territories were labeled as “Malay”
peoples and were primarily Muslim. Therefore, a majority of these commercial centers
were sultanates which came to be indirectly ruled by the Dutch.
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Beginning in 1848, Christian missionaries began to penetrate the central regions
of Borneo. These were the first people to assign the term “Dayak” to the indigenous
peoples of the “interior” of Borneo in order to differentiate them from the Malay Muslims
who lived with the Dutch on the coasts (Bertrand, 2004, p.50). Elites of the indigenous
groups would use this label to unify indigenous tribal peoples in response to the rising
force of Islamic nationalism throughout Kalimantan. By 1919, Dayaks had formed
associations and organized nominal support had been formed for the Sarekat Dayak
which would later become Pakat Dayak (Bertrand, 2004, p.50). The similarities of
indigenous cultures and traditions along with the desire to preserve Dayak lands were
stressed by these groups.
During World War II the Japanese invasions of Borneo eliminated European
colonial authority along the periphery of the island and limited the political expression of
communities throughout the archipelago. The Japanese occupation of the island, similar
to Dutch colonialism, was strongest along the coasts of Borneo. As the loss of the
occupying forces became increasingly eminent, Indonesian nationalism was rising
throughout the region. The threat posed to the Dayak peoples by intensifying Islamic
nationalism created the foundation for indigenous Dayak peoples’ alignment with the
Dutch in the Indonesian revolution. In the 1940s, when many regions of Indonesia were
fighting for the creation of a new Republic the indigenous tribes of Kalimantan feared
their inclusion into an Islamic Indonesian state.
However, in 1946 the Dutch attempted to capitalize on Dayak support and agreed
to the creation of the Great Dayak (Dayak Besar) semi-autonomous region in Central
Kalimantan (Bertrand, 2004, p.51). A Dayak council was formed from the Pakat Dayak
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group and other Dayak leaders to take authority within the developing Dayak homeland.
In West Kalimantan, similar developments had occurred. The West Kalimantan Council
was established by The Netherlands to provide representation for various self-governing
territories which were held by the Dutch. The region subsequently formed its own
constitution and was provided with special status in 1947 (Bertrand, 2004, p.51). The
people of the Great Dayak had gained representation in a modern governmental
institution for the first time.
However, sovereignty over these and other territories was passed from the Dutch
to the newly formed Indonesian state in 1949. In the next year a new constitution
claimed Dutch Borneo as part of the Republic of Indonesia. This constitution and the
new authority of the Indonesian Republic led to the dissolution of the Special Region of
West Kalimantan and the Dayak Besar by the unitary Indonesian state. All of the
Indonesian regions of Borneo were consolidated within the province of Kalimantan.
Past Dayak support for the Dutch colonial authority caused the indigenous
peoples of Kalimantan to be labeled as traitors by the unitary Indonesian state and the
term “Dayak” became synonymous with treachery to the Indonesian state (Bertrand,
2004, p.51). As a result the regional political institutions became dominated by Javanese,
and Dayaks failed to gain reasonable representation in the political formations of the
Indonesian republic. In response to this underrepresentation, the United Dayak Party
(PPD) was formed in the 1950s along purely ethnic lines. This was denounced by the
nationalist parties and was viewed as a return to times of Dutch instigation of
divisiveness along ethnic lines. The results of future elections in Kalimantan left the PPD
and the greater Dayak community without substantial gains in representation.
61

While the Darul Islam movement was gaining momentum in regions throughout
Indonesia, the Pakat Dayak and PPD paralleled this movement with their own demands
for the creation of a Dayak province. Facing the challenge of Islamic nationalism
spanning from Aceh to the eastern islands of the archipelago, Sukarno conceded to Dayak
requests and signed a decree creating the province of Central Kalimantan in 1957
selecting a Dayak as governor (Bertrand, 2004, p.53). Shortly thereafter, Sukarno’s
Guided Democracy policies dissolved several Muslim political parties and eliminated
elected councils which granted greater authority to governors, including the Dayak
governor of Central Kalimantan. This ensured that Dayaks dominated the political
institutions of the province and were given increased social and political control. In spite
of Sukarno’s banning of political parties based upon ethnic lines in the 1960s, the
thorough representation of Dayaks in Central Kalimantan would continue. However, in
West Kalimantan, where the Dayak population was largest, PPD did not gain thorough
support from the Dayak communities of West Kalimantan. There continued to be an
underrepresentation of Dayaks in this province.
With the arrival of Suharto’s New Order government the Dayak peoples of
Kalimantan lost political participation and were categorized by the government as
backwards and primitive (Bertrand, 2004, p.54). The Republic’s focus upon development
brought with it an influx of migrated peoples through the transmigration polices of the
New Order. This movement of peoples from regions throughout the archipelago by the
Indonesian government was done to develop the lands of Kalimantan and, as such,
migrants were given authority to seize and exploit territory throughout Kalimantan.
Compounding the impacts of these policies upon the indigenous tribal peoples of the
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island were the resettlement programs which sought to move Dayaks from remote
communities to villages which were considered to meet modern standards.
The traditional norms of authority and social order in Dayak communities were
discarded by these policies in place of “Indonesian” standards (Bertrand, 2004, p.54).
Local government reforms were packaged in similar ways, replacing the customary laws,
indigenous institutions, and agriculture and forest-based livelihoods with those imported
from Jakarta. West and Central Kalimantan were overrun with loggers, plantations, and
commercial resource companies as the Indonesian government engaged in transmigration
policies and agreements for the extraction of Kalimantan’s natural resources. Increased
displacement of the indigenous, traditionally forest dwelling tribes occurred while there
was a continuing loss of social and political representation and relevance of the Dayak
communities. The official transmigration policies of Indonesia combined with
spontaneous population movements to increase the number of migrated peoples. This
deepened the disaffection of Dayak peoples with the Indonesian government. These
policies which introduced hundreds-of-thousands of extra-regional peoples began in the
twentieth century by the Dutch and continued to the early twenty-first century through
the development policies of the New Order government.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, intermittent eruptions of violence occurred in the
West and Central provinces of Kalimantan. Much of this violence was in the form of
altercations between the Dayak and Madurese populations of Kalimantan. These
confrontations continued into the 2000s with intermittent acts of violence, ritualized
warfare, and destruction of property. While minimal violence has been experienced in
subsequent years, tensions between the Dayak and Madurese communities of Central and
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West Kalimantan have persisted. Notions of Dayak identity and the grievances held by
the indigenous peoples of Kalimantan are believed to form the foundation for these past
instances of collective violence. Through a deconstruction of the traits which have
contributed to the identity formations and internalizations of Dayak peoples it will be
possible to further develop an understanding of identities’ role in collective violence.
Deconstructing Dayak Identity
Although the indigenous communities of the interior regions of Kalimantan have
cultivated distinct social qualities and institutions throughout their long histories,
collectively they are referred to as “Dayaks”. This label was inorganically developed and
assigned to the indigenous, tribal population of the interior of Borneo which is made up
of a “large number of tribal groups with different languages and customs” (Bertrand,
2004, p.48). In spite of this categorization and their inherent diversity, the internal
identifications and self-understandings of the peoples labeled as “Dayak” became
increasingly shared over time. By the close of the Dutch colonial era collective notions
of Dayak identity had gained increasing acceptance in many tribal communities.
Through a study of the relational and categorical qualities which have contributed
to the identifications, categorizations, self-understandings, and, ultimately, notions of
Dayak solidarity, a clearer understanding of the ways in which the diverse tribal
communities of Kalimantan have aligned will be developed. The relational and
categorical traits which are a part of Dayak identity and have contributed to connections
and commonality of Dayak communities are ancestral territories, political formations,
and ethnonationalism. These notions of identity and solidarity have gained further
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traction within indigenous communities through the grievances and social and political
disaffection the Dayak people have experienced in contemporary times.
As has been previously stated, the diversity of Dayak peoples has made their
unification into a single ethnic group problematic. The tribes and villages categorized as
such have their own social, religious, and political institutions and traditions. In spite of
this diversity, the label has provided the indigenous peoples of Borneo with a notion of
identity which has been increasingly internalized by people and exercised through social
and political organizations. The early 1900s were the breeding ground for increased
associations between Borneo’s indigenous peoples. Between 1919 and 1926, the Sarekat
Dayak and Pakat Dayak were formed to cultivate and preserve the cultural commonalities
of various Dayak tribal groups. However, it was not until the 1950s when indigenous
elites sought to unite the people of the interior regions of Borneo against the threat posed
by the Islamic nationalist movement Darul Islam (Bertrand, 2004, p.50). In subsequent
years the connections were solidified through increasingly shared relational and
categorical values. One such common trait is the value placed on the Dayaks’ ancestral
territories.
Considering that the Dayaks have been forest-dwelling and agricultural peoples
for centuries, it becomes apparent that the lands of their ancestry would be of great
importance for the sustainment of their cultures and societies. These people cultivated
the forest and lands with nominal interference from outsiders until the 19th century. They
maintained nomadic agricultural practices which required the ability to abandon lands
when they were no longer fruitful in order to seek more productive land. Swidden
agriculture and the attachment of these peoples to the rainforest regions has been a part of
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their heritage and is one shared ancestral trait. However, the shared identification and
self-understandings developed through these interior rainforest-covered regions is not
solely a result of historical and agricultural value of the lands.
The Dayak Besar, or Dayak homeland, is a concept which has held great sway
over the identity formation and self-understandings of the indigenous peoples of
Kalimantan. In the years before the Indonesian declaration of independence, the Dayak
people sought control over territories to ensure the preservation of their cultures and
social and political institutions. By supporting the Dutch in their bid for archipelagic
control the Dayaks gained a homeland on the island of Borneo in the 1940s. However,
this authority was dismantled by the Indonesian unitary state. The region was unified
into a single province and these changes effectively dismantled the institutions and
representation of Dayaks within the unitary state. As poor representation persisted Dayak
calls for the creation of a Dayak province in Central Kalimantan rose and coincided with
the Muslim rebellions led by Darul Islam throughout Indonesia. Sukarno placated the
Dayak calls for lands by creating the province of Central Kalimantan in 1957 (Bertrand,
2004, p.53).
This province provided Dayaks with greater control and representation into the
mid-1960s. However, three years after the Dayak political party PPD began to gain
positions throughout the province, Sukarno banned political parties based upon
ethnicities. This change effectively destroyed coherent political involvement by the
Dayak population. In subsequent years the Dayak people would be increasingly
displaced by migrated peoples, resource agreements, and development policies of the
New Order government of Suharto. The New Order categorized Dayaks as “backwards”
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and viewed them as a hurdle to modernity and development of the region (Bertrand,
2004, p.54). These categorizations and the policies which surrounded the Indonesian
state’s approach to indigenous peoples further solidified the identifications and selfunderstandings of the Dayaks and would lead them into increasingly aligning notions of
identity.
The historic cultivation of the interior regions of Kalimantan by Dayak peoples
followed by the multiple formations and dissolutions of the Dayak Besar over these
territories has caused many Dayaks to form shared identifications and selfunderstandings. The loss of Dayak autonomy and the resulting reduction of indigenous
representation and participation in Indonesian institutions provided further sources of
collective identity formation and grievances against the Indonesian state and other
regional populations. Ancestral territories over which Dayak authority has been granted
and reneged upon are a relational feature which has been shared among the indigenous
tribal people of the provinces of Kalimantan. While they are related to the territories of
the Dayak people, the migration of regional peoples and the cultivation of resources in
Kalimantan have also contributed to Dayak collective notions of self.
The traits which are shared among the Dayak people are one source of identity,
but so are the strong differences which have existed between indigenous peoples and the
people who have migrated to Kalimantan. It is possible to understand more about the
identity of the Dayaks by considering the people from whom they have consistently
attempted to differentiate themselves. Through the movement of commerce and goods
the coastal regions of Borneo have been home to many peoples. However, the Dutch
colonial authority introduced policies which encouraged migration of peoples to the
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resource rich and underdeveloped island of Borneo. This began in the 1930s and was
continued by the Indonesian Republic into the 2000s. The transfer of Indonesians from
densely populated areas to underdeveloped regions was utilized as a means of developing
the peripheral islands of the Indonesian archipelago. Kalimantan’s low population
density and plentiful natural resources led it to be considered, along with other
archipelagic lands, an idyllic destination for transmigrated populations. Of the migrants
of this era the Madurese were the most visible in their increased movement to the region
(Bertrand, 2004, p.55).
Between 1986 to 2002 hundreds of thousands of people from diverse regions of
Indonesia were introduced to Kalimantan (Achwan, et.al., 2005, p.11). Transmigration
was paired with the resettlement of Dayak populations from remote regions into more
modern villages throughout Kalimantan. “Primitive” populations were targeted to
encourage lifestyles and cultural associations more in line with “Indonesian standards”
(Bertrand, 2004, p.54). The combination of these policies challenged Dayak traditions
and culture which led the Dayak to view some transmigrated peoples as enemies.
Transmigration also contributed to the Indonesian state’s treading further into the
ancestral lands of Kalimantan’s indigenous peoples. Development policies and a failure
to recognize Dayak land rights further exacerbated the divisions between indigenous and
migrant populations.
The influx of outsiders coincided with the regional extraction of resources to the
benefit of the central government of Indonesia rather than local peoples, including the
Dayaks. Transmigrated settlers were granted land, logging and resource rights while the
Dayak populations’ rights were not recognized by Jakarta. Deforestation of traditionally
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Dayak regions and the exclusivity of rights to the resources of Kalimantan led to the
sense of displacement within the Dayak population, while economic inequalities were
continuously intensified. The deepening divide between settlers and indigenous
populations of Kalimantan was contributed to by development activities and the policies
which supported them. As an agrarian society, the loss of access to various lands upset
the agricultural patterns and livelihoods of the Dayaks. The indigenous population was
slow to adjust to the changing conditions in Kalimantan and found themselves at an
economic, political, and social disadvantage relative to the influx of governmentally
condoned settlers.
Outside of these contemporary alignments of values related to identity, the Dayak
people have historically been nomadic, tribal communities with minimal associations to
one another and distinct cultural traits and social structures. The solidarity of Dayaks has
been made possible more through the relational affiliations formed among indigenous
peoples rather than the categorical similarities they share. Ancestral territories, their lack
of kinship with and acceptance of transmigrated peoples, and the invasive development
policies applied to Kalimantan by the Dutch and the Indonesian state have been the
foundational sources of Dayak connectedness. Commonality, therefore, is primarily a
result of the ethnic label of “Dayak”. This label has been adopted by large segments of
the indigenous population of Kalimantan. Political elites and the institutions and
movements which have championed this label have stressed the shared consciousness and
cultural values of these people, thereby reinforcing the commonality which is present
among indigenous, tribal communities.
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The policies of colonial and Indonesian authorities have contributed to the
formation of the grievances held by Dayaks. Realization and dissolution of the Dayak
Besar is a central understanding within Dayak identities. This is viewed as the precursor
to decades of underrepresentation and marginalization which has played a substantial role
in the aligning of Dayak peoples. Throughout the closing years of Dutch colonialism and
into the 21st century, policies of transmigration have allowed, if not encouraged, the
movement of outside populations to Kalimantan and into Dayak lands. This policy has
undermined the traditions and practices of the nomadic, Dayak communities and has also
caused them to lose lands to foreign developers and commercial enterprises. The New
Order policies encouraging development and modernity in Kalimantan have diminished
the Dayaks’ social and economic status. In short, the policies related to the Dayak
homeland, transmigration, regional development and other issues have contributed to the
development of grievances and hardening of identities. Social and economic policies in
Kalimantan have led to the rise of protests against governmental development, social, and
environmental policies. However, the disparity of military power between the national
government and the Dayaks has led the indigenous populations to attack transmigrated
populations in lieu of the national government (Bertrand, 2004, p.55).
A shared sense of belonging cultivated by aspects of connectedness and
commonality has also been facilitated by social and political organizations, namely the
Pakat Dayak, Sarekat Dayak, and the PPD political party. These organizations rose as
ethnic platforms and with aims of organizing Dayak peoples under shared interests and
cultural values. Specifically, they worked to bring Dayaks together against the
deformation of indigenous cultures, the threat of regional Islamic nationalism, and
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underrepresentation in Indonesian government institutions. While the term “Dayak” was
developed inorganically, the elite adoption and subsequent organization of diverse
communities under shared values and affiliations has solidified connectedness and
commonality into acceptance and internalization of this collective notion of identity.
Through these values and the affiliations there have been substantial increases in
collective identifications, self-understandings, and associations. The contemporary
conflicts between Dayaks and transmigrated peoples reflect the role of identity, supported
by shared grievances, as a collective basis for violent action.
By exploring the qualities which are shared among Dayaks, this discussion has
developed clear understandings of Dayak notions of identity. It has also related these
features to the cohesion of the indigenous peoples of Kalimantan in their internalizations,
self-understandings, and group solidarity as they are contributed to by relational and
categorical traits. This study’s focus upon collective identities has not required
specificity at the village and tribal level. Therefore, the contexts provided related to
Dayak identity should not be viewed as encapsulating the many diverse forms present
within this ethnic category. These collective notions of identity will be related to
contemporary instances of collective violence in the following section. This is necessary
in order to fully appreciate the potential relationships between identities and actions
undertaken by Dayaks and other regional communities in conflict.
Regional Collective Violence
West and Central Kalimantan have been the epicenters of social violence and
movements for autonomy within the population of the island which began in 1996 and
have continued into the 2000s. Confrontations between ethnic groups in these provinces
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have occurred along social fissures related to group identities. The resulting violence
within the island’s population has occurred among several groups with a variety of
identity influences. However, the primary eruptions of violence have arisen between the
indigenous Dayak and transmigrated Madurese communities of the island. The conflict
experienced in West and Central Kalimantan coincide with the traditional lands of
indigenous populations and Dayak ancestral lands which have been granted and
subsequently denied autonomy in Indonesia’s past.
Central Kalimantan has, in its contemporary history, experienced high levels of
violence stemming from the development, economic, and social policies of the
government. Furthering this violence has been the segregation, stereotyping, and
marginalization of Dayak peoples. The Indonesian government’s capacity to subdue the
escalation of violence and tensions between 1996 and the early-2000s was extremely
limited due to the sheer number of people who have engaged in aggression and the
destruction and violence which characterized these clashes.
In order to provide a clear representation of the intermittent upsurges in violence,
the violence will be broken into three periods. The confrontation which occurred from
1996 to 1997 was the outset of collective acts of violence and destruction between Dayak
and Madurese peoples. Subsequently, the months prior to the fall of Suharto also saw a
rise in conflict between these communities and in 2001 there was widespread rioting and
continuing harmful acts carried out by both the Dayaks and Madurese of Kalimantan.
This sectioned approach will be combined with the categories and indicators of Gurr and
Bishop to understand the types, agencies, and acts of violence which have been present in
West and Central Kalimantan. The understandings formed in the historical and identity
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overviews above will be combined with this assessment to develop conclusions reflecting
the relationship which exists between identity and violence in Kalimantan.
In the years leading up to the violence experienced from 1996 to 1997 there was a
growing movement by the leadership of Dayak communities to seek redress for
continuing grievances related to the economic and social marginalization of the Dayaks
(Achwan, et.al., 2005, p.15). Public protests and demonstrations as well as the
sabotaging of companies and government properties were common in the years leading
up to the violence between Madurese and Dayaks. These demonstrations and the
destruction of property were an exercise of Dayak demands for more just management of
natural resources and the recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights. On December 29th of
1996 when a group of Madurese attacked two Dayaks near Singkawang, West
Kalimantan tensions escalated into public violence between the two communities
(Bertrand, 2004, p.56).
As word of the attack upon the two Dayaks spread throughout the Dayak
population there began to be attacks upon Madurese people and homes throughout the
area. These attacks were accompanied by calls for the removal of Madurese peoples
from Dayak traditional lands. Hamlets primarily inhabited by Madurese were targeted
and the homes, stores, and crops of these communities were burned by Dayak rioters.
Confrontation between the two ethnic groups was limited as much of the Madurese
population sought the protection of the Indonesian military at their stationary posts.
Madurese peoples retaliated by burning Dayak homes and the offices of a Dayak NGO in
Pontianak. In spite of this reprisal, by the beginning of mid-February, 1997 tensions had
diminished and relative stability had returned.
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However, later in that same month Dayaks had prepared for tribal warfare. The
“red bowl” had been passed from village to village throughout Samba, which is a Dayak
ritualized declaration of war, indicating the Dayaks’ intention to enter into open hostilities
with the Madurese (Achwan, et.al., 2005,p.17). Other tribal customs including taking of
potions, wearing of amulets, as well as ancient traditions of headhunting and cannibalism
reemerged to encourage solidarity among the warriors and instill fear in the enemy.
These traditions would also be practiced in future instances of war with the Madurese in
Kalimantan. The attacks of the Dayak war in Samba were made against military
installations in search of the Madurese being protected by the army as well as Madurese
homes and mosques. These attacks and rumors of increasing Dayak violence led a group
of Madurese to attack a Catholic boarding school. This continued the escalation of
tensions in West Kalimantan and led to reciprocal violence between Dayak and Madurese
populations in other districts including Pontianak and Sanggau. In certain regions the
Indonesian military intervened to protect the Madurese populations, which further
instilled distrust and further distanced the Dayaks from the Indonesian state. It has been
estimated that approximately 500 people died in the violence and over 20,000 Madurese
were displaced as a result of attacks and destruction in hamlets (Bertrand, 2004, p.48).
Following several years of decreased levels of violence, the fall of Suharto and his
New Order government brought with it an era of liberalization and expression of regional
demands throughout the archipelago. In 1999 and in this environment violence once
again erupted in Samba, West Kalimantan. This conflict began as a confrontation
between Malay and Madurese communities. The initiating incident was the beating of a
Madurese thief by the members of a Malay community in Samba (Bertrand, 2004, p.56).
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Malay witnesses to the beating led an attack the on that Malay village with the assistance
of hundreds of Madurese that had come to the area to take part in the attack on the
community. There was an escalation in violence between Madurese and Malay peoples
over the next month. Following the death of a Dayak during these hostile exchanges
between Malays and Madurese, Dayak fighters joined the fringes of the conflict attacking
the Madurese “in a devastating example of ethnic cleansing” (Achwan, et.al., 2005, p.17).
The ethnic killings which occurred at this time were some of the most vicious attacks
seen throughout the conflict between Dayak and Madurese populations. Official
estimates suggest that 186 people were killed, there was massive destruction of property,
and over 25,000 Madurese became internally displaced peoples or refugees (Bertrand,
2004, p.58).
The impetus for Dayak involvement was the death of a member of the Dayak
community in the exchanges between Malays and Madurese. Also, this confrontation
between Malays and Madurese was occurring in Samba, the same region as previous
confrontations between Madurese and Dayaks. Previous instances of violence had
already seated distrust between these communities. Furthering this disaffection, during
the New Order era the seizing of land or “land grabbing” was not punishable and this had
led to confrontations between the Madurese and Malays, Dayaks, and Chinese when land
previously held by these groups was taken. The district of Samba was seemingly poised
for a collective confrontation between the Madurese and the other local ethnic
communities.
As tensions receded, relative stability took hold once again. However, in 2001 the
Central Kalimantan would erupt in violence. This period of hostilities occurred as the
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result of rioting which was initiated by a confrontation between Dayak and Madurese
timber and construction workers (Achwan, et.al., 2005, p.21). As in previous escalations
of violence, an attack upon an individual was followed by an escalation in collective
violence which would leave local police and military unable to respond or mitigate the
damages. Word of a fight between several Madurese and Dayaks in a Karaoke bar in
Sampit spread through the Dayak population and tensions and bloodshed rose throughout
several regions of Central Kalimantan. Following days of local attacks and retributions,
the conflict escalated to include thousands of Dayaks who participated in acts of violence
against Madurese. In the days and months to follow Dayaks flowed into the city and
began to kill the Madurese population and burn Madurese homes. The Dayak attacks
caused the majority of the Madurese population to flee for the jungle or to seek protection
from the police and other government offices. After only a month of violent exchanges
486 people had been killed and by the next month over 100,000 Madurese had been
evacuated to other parts of Indonesia (Achwan, et.al., 2005, p.23).
These periods of violence between the Dayaks, Malays, and Madurese
communities of West and Central Kalimantan have consisted of various forms of violence
which have been conceptualized within the work of Gurr and Bishop (1976) and some
that have not. First, the contextual forms of violence, specifically structural patterns of
denial, produced social, economic, and political environments which contributed to later
acts of physical violence. Once acts of physical violence had been undertaken, they
quickly escalated along cleavages which had been established through identity formation
and the social structures which categorized the various communities of West and Central
Kalimantan.
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Prior to the violence of 1996 and persisting beyond 2001, the Indonesian
government had established institutions and policies which developed fixed social
locations throughout Kalimantan. The Dayak people of the region were systematically
discriminated against in economic and social spheres, denied autonomous or semiautonomous territories, and their customs and traditions were targeted by the Indonesians
for modernization. All of these are indicative of patterns of denial which have been
categorized as forms of structural violence by Gurr and Bishop. The subordination of
indigenous peoples, negation of autonomy, and threats against their culture helped to
form hostilities and grievances within Dayak communities.
The protests and demonstrations which preceded the violence of 1996 were an
expression of these frustrations. These expressions of grievance and the destruction of
private and public properties which accompanied them were acts of violence at a
collective level. While all of these acts constitute violence, they were less destructive
than the periods of violence which followed these outbursts of frustration.
In each of the periods discussed above there were many actors carrying out
violence both in coordination with and independently of others. However, the inciting
physical attacks and the subsequent violence of all of these episodes were engaged in by
individuals and groups without support of the Indonesian government or other official
authority, making them private acts of violence. There were both individual and
collective harmful acts carried out against rival communities. The initial aggression in
each of these periods was representative of individual instances of beatings, homicide,
and assassination. It is apparent that these are physical acts of violence, while the
burning of homes, stores, and other property reflects an escalation of violence to a
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collective. This destruction of property and the potential human casualties suggest that
these activities can be likened to the terms “riot”, “rebellion”, or “coup” as presented by
Gurr and Bishop (1976, p.84). While the contexts of West and Central Kalimantan did
not have direct impacts upon the stability or overthrow of the Indonesian government as
these terms may suggest, they are responses to structural and physical forms of violence
which Dayaks were resisting through hostilities.
People were also killed through ritualized warfare. This form of confrontation is
essential in the consideration of the conflicts between Dayak and Madurese communities.
These traditional means of Dayak warfare suggest a level of cohesion and solidarity
among indigenous peoples. The communal nature of the rituals and actions surrounding
this form of conflict are most similar to the notions of riot or rebellion indicated by Gurr
and Bishop. These riots and the killings they included led to the death and displacement
of many Madurese.
Sub-Conclusion
The Dayaks of West and Central Kalimantan hold distinct collective
identifications and understandings which have formed the basis for group cohesion
and supported collective violence. Through ancestral lands, social and political
formations, and ethnic identifications, the diverse indigenous Dayak people have
become increasingly allied. Shared contemporary frustrations, perceived abuses
and exploitation, and historically developed disaffection for “foreigners” have
furthered the widespread cohesion of Dayak peoples.
The focus of Dayak violence has been another regional community, the
Madurese, in spite of the fact that it has been the regional migration and
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development policies of the Indonesian government which have heavily impacted
indigenous tribes. The relative disparity of force between the Dayaks and the
Indonesian state has been presented as one reason for this. Other reasons have
included the visibility of the Madurese in contemporary migrations and the
exclusivity and reticence of the predominantly Islamic Madurese communities in
Kalimantan. Irrespective of these rationales, it is clear that Dayak communities in
both West and Central Kalimantan have acted in violent cooperation against the
Madurese and Dayak communities have been connected through common aspects
of identity.
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Conclusion
By first exploring the historical foundations of the Indonesian archipelago a
thorough context was created upon which the studies of Aceh and West and Central
Kalimantan were developed. In combination with this regional overview, the
deconstruction of the terminology surrounding identity and violence provided more
thorough conceptualizations of the qualities which contribute to the character of societies
and the forms of diverse expressions of violence. Applying the analytical perspectives of
Brubaker and Cooper (2000) has moved beyond a one dimensional model of identity and
delved into the diverging traits encapsulated within the term. The work of Gurr and
Bishop (1976) has also contributed to this study by allowing for a complete appreciation
of the various acts, forms, and agencies which are at work in violence. These approaches
have been complimented by works from diverse disciplines including anthropology,
history, psychology, sociology, and political science.
The relational and categorical traits of identity which have been discussed
throughout the case studies have been viewed by some as causes of collective violence.
While a causal relationship between identities and collective violence is not established
through this study and the cases considered above, the significance of group cohesion is
made remarkably apparent. The commonality, collectiveness, and “groupness” which are
developed through shared relational and categorical traits are necessary precursors to the
solidarity which is required for violence to be termed “collective”. So, while diverse
identities do not cause violent acts in and of themselves, widespread acceptance of the
underlying traits of identity does contribute to group cohesion. This, in turn, facilitates
the capacity for violent actions to be carried out in a collective manner.
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As the historical overviews of Aceh and Kalimantan have shown, identities are
negotiated and cultivated through the experiences of regional peoples as well as the
aligning identifications and self-understandings. In Aceh, GAM has led contemporary
occurrences of collective violence against the Indonesian state and the peoples and
institutions which have represented the presence of the Republic in Aceh. By appealing
to grievances and aspects of identity related to Acehnese ancestry, territory, religion, and
language the organization gained supporters and sustained a persistent guerilla resistance
in pursuit of regional autonomy and independence. The relational and categorical
qualities utilized by GAM have been shared among Acehnese people, which furthered the
commonality and collectiveness of ethnic Acehnese. Through these shared notions,
group solidarity and a proactive commitment to Acehnese values has been possible and
has facilitated the collective nature of the violence engaged in by GAM and its
supporters.
In the Dayak communities of West and Central Kalimantan the shared sources of
frustration and identity brought diverse indigenous tribal communities together. The
ethnic label of “Dayak” allowed for the formation of political and social organizations
which linked tribal villages while the ancestral lands, ethnic identifications, and
objections against migrated populations developed categorical and relational bonds.
Unlike in Aceh, collective violence was targeted at the Madurese communities of
Kalimantan in spite of the Indonesian government’s hand in the alienation and
exploitation of Dayaks. In spite of this inconsistency, the communal nature of the
hostilities in the provinces of West and Central Kalimantan were enabled through
overlapping identifications and self-understandings, and the subsequent Dayak cohesion
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which was cultivated. These actions and the contributing pieces of identity presented
above have been reactions to the influences and policies of the Indonesian government
and peoples considered outsiders by indigenous peoples. Similarly, these are the
institutions and peoples against whom grievances are held by many indigenous peoples.
As the proactive and reactive nature of regional collective notions of identity
referenced above suggest, collective notions of self and many of the shared traits of
Acehnese and Dayak peoples are fluid and have been continually negotiated. These
regions, Aceh and Kalimantan, are reflective of the evolution of group identities as well
as the prevalence of violence throughout Indonesia.
Structural violence, namely structures of coercion and patterns of denial, have
been prevalent in the regions considered. The Indonesian government has maintained
force structures and policies which have impacted both the Acehnese and Dayak
identities and these nations’ participation in violent acts. These have contributed to the
grievances of regional peoples and instances of violence between the Indonesian
government and the Acehnese and regional populations in Kalimantan. These structures,
therefore, have been paralleled by acts of physical violence at the collective level.
Between 1996 and 2003, deaths and incidents of physical acts of collective violence
escalated dramatically as is shown in Figure 2 (see Appendix). While not solely
attributable to the regions of Aceh and Kalimantan, the instances of collective violence
throughout Indonesia correspond with the intensification of such incidents and actions in
these regions.
Further studies addressing the role of identity in collective violence are
encouraged. By engaging in further evaluation of the terminology developed by
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Brubaker and Cooper (2000), the study of identity in various contexts can be conducted
without a reification of terminology. This study has sought an analytical approach to the
term “identity”. By means of a thorough consideration of the qualities which contribute
to this term, a more complete evaluation of the relational and categorical traits of
Acehnese and Dayak peoples has been developed. This has contributed to clearer
conclusions related to the role of identity in Acehnese and Dayak solidarity and the
environment in which regional instances of collective violence have occurred.
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Appendix
Figure 1: (Gurr and Bishop, 1976)
Comparative Indicators of Types of "Violence"

Figure 2: (Source: Varshney, et. al., 2004)

87

